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THE  INFLUENCE  OF  ARISTOTLE'S 

"POLITICS"  AND  "ETHICS" 

ON  SPENSER 


A  DISSERTATION 

SUBMITTED  TO   THE  FACULTY 

OF   THE   GRADUATE   SCHOOL   OF   ARTS   AND   LITERATURE 

IN   CANDIDACY   FOR   THE   DEGREE   OF 

DOCTOR   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

DEPARTMENT  OF  ENGLISH 


BY 

WILLIAM  FENN  DeMOSS 


Private  Edition,  Distributed  By 

THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO  LIBRARIES 

CHICAGO,  ILLINOIS 


Reprinted  in  part  from 

Modern  Philology,  Vol.  XVI,  Nos.  i  and  5 

May  and  September,  1918 


35lC»<,>p,iO.^ 


Composed  and  Printed  By 

The  University  of  Chicaffo  Press 

Chicago.  Illinois,  U.S.A. 


cp  1 


PREFACE 

The  main  part  of  this  thesis,  the  discussion  of  Aristotle's  influ- 
ence on  the  Faerie  Queene,  was  written  in  reply  to  an  article  by 
Ambassador  J.  J.  Jusserand,  in  Modern  Philology,  Volume  III,  and 
was  published  in  the  same  journal  in  May  and  September  of  1918. 

I  am  principally  indebted  to  my  teachers,  Professors  John 
Matthews  Manly  and  Charles  Read  Baskervill,  who  have  made 
valuable  suggestions,  and  to  my  wife,  Irene  C.  DeMoss,  who  has 
rendered  valuable  assistance,  and  whose  intelligent  interest  has  been 
a  source  of  inspiration. 


433154 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Introduction 1 


Aristotle's  Influence  on  the  Faerie  Queene 7 

"Mutability" 49 

A  Veue  of  the  Present  State  of  Ireland 65 

The  Shepheardes  Calender  and  the  Minor  Poems 69 


UNiV     . 


INTRODUCTION 

The  age  in  which  Spenser  lived  must  be  kept  in  mind  by  him  who 
would  understand  Spenser's  works.  Like  other  men  of  genius, 
Spenser  was  greatly  influenced  by  his  time. 

The  central  purpose  of  the  Faerie  Queene,  set  forth  in  the  famous 
letter  to  Raleigh,  is  a  case  in  point.  Spenser  tells  us,  "The  generall 
end  ....  of  all  the  booke  is  to  fashion  a  gentleman  or  noble  person 
in  vertuous  and  gentle  discipline."  This  purpose,  together  with 
Spenser's  plan  for  carrying  it  out,  strongly  reflects  the  outlook  which, 
in  the  Renaissance,  had  been  produced  by  the  study  of  philosophy. 
The  problem  which  Spenser  undertakes  was  regarded,  both  at  home 
and  abroad,  as  of  paramount  importance.*  All  serious  writers  of 
the  Renaissance  had  written  educational  treatises  more  or  less  like 
the  Faerie  Queene.  Such  are  Skelton's  Magnyfycence,  Elyot's 
Governour,  Wilson's  Rhetorique,  Castiglione's  Courtier  (translated 
into  English  in  1561),  and  Ascham's  Schoolmaster.  These  works, 
like  Spenser's,  teach  virtues  and  have  in  view  the  ideal  man.  The 
novels  of  the  period,  for  example  Lyly's  Euphues  and  Sidney's 
Arcadia,  reflect  the  same  serious  purpose.  The  esteem  in  which  such 
studies  were  held  is  indicated  by  the  fact  that  Ascham,  in  his  School- 
master, approved  heartily  of  Castiglione's  Courtier,  and  Sidney 
carried  the  Courtier  always  in  his  pocket  when  he  went  abroad.^ 
The  teaching  of  morals,  including  manners,  was  of  vital  interest. 
Erasmus,  that  typical  figure  of  the  Renaissance,  held  moral  and 
religious  training  to  be  the  highest  purpose  of  all  right  education. 
The  systematic  teaching  of  morals,  from  ethical  writers,  historians, 
and  poets,  formed  an  important  part  of  a  classical  education  in  the 
Renaissance.'  British  schools,  including  Cambridge  and  Oxford 
universities,  gave  much  attention  to  the  teaching  of  morals  and 

1  See  J.  J.  Jusserand's  A  Literary  History  of  the  English  People,  II  (London  and  New 
York,  1906),  476. 

2  See  W.  H.  Woodward,  Education  during  the  Renaissance,  Cambridge,  1906,  p.  295. 
'  See  Woodward,  op.  cit.,  p.  125. 

1 


2'':  .'••:'.••  '''A'Ri'S'TOTL'E'S  INFLUENCE  ON  SPENSER 

manners.^  Again,  the  aristocratic  element  in  Spenser's  purpose — 
the  design  to  "fashion  a  gentleman  or  noble  person" — reflects  the 
spirit  of  the  Renaissance.  Elyot  writes  to  teach  virtues  to  those 
who  are  to  have  "authority  in  a  weal  public."^  Skelton's  hero  is  a 
prince.  Castiglione's  courtier  and  statesman  is  of  noble  birth. 
Lyly's  Euphues  is  aristocratic,  as  is  also  Sidney's  Arcadia.  The  con- 
ception that  poetry  should  teach,  implied  in  Spenser's  purpose, 
shows  the  influence  of  the  Renaissance.  It  has  its  classical  basis 
in  Aristotle  (Ethics  and  Politics)  and  in  Horace.  Once  more,  the 
omniscience  which  Spenser's  purpose  requires  of  a  gentleman  or 
noble  person  reflects  the  Renaissance.  The  Renaissance,  with  the 
"perfyte  man"  in  view,  felt  that  a  nobleman  should  know  well- 
nigh  everything.'  This  belief,  drawn  from  the  ancients,  largely 
from  Aristotle,  was  encouraged  by  the  example  of  the  court  during 
the  reigns  of  the  learned  Henry  VIII  and  Elizabeth.  "Never," 
says  Roger  Ascham,  "has  the  English  nobility  been  so  learned."* 
Spenser,  as  is  shown  in  his  letter  to  Raleigh,  has  it  in  mind  to  fashion 
a  gentleman,  or  noble  person,  'perfected'  in  all  virtues,  both  moral 
and  political — perfect  in  morals,  manners,  divinity,  and  statesman- 
ship— the  perfect  man. 

Another  thing  which  shows  how  Spenser  was  influenced  by  his 
time  is  his  choice  of  a  master.  In  telling,  in  the  letter  to  Raleigh, 
how  he  intends  to  "fashion  a  gentleman,"  he  says,  "I  labour  to 
pourtraict  in  Arthure,  before  he  was  king,  the  image  of  a  brave 
knight,  perfected  in  the  twelve  private  morall  vertues,  as  Aristotle 
hath  devised,  the  which  is  the  purpose  of  these  first  twelve  bookes: 
which  if  I  finde  to  be  well  accepted,  I  may  be  perhaps  encoraged,  to 
frame  the  other  part  of  poUiticke  vertues  in  his  person,  after  that  hee 
came  to  be  king,"  etc.  From  this  it  would  seem  that  Spenser 
intended  to  follow  not  only  Aristotle's  treatment  of  the  moral  virtues 
but  also  his  discussion  of  politics. 

Aristotle  and  Plato  were  the  great  teachers  of  the  Renaissance. 
There  were,  to  be  sure,  attacks  upon  Aristotle.  But  people  attack 
what  is  important.     Besides,  these  attacks  would  have  little  influence 

«  See  Jusserand,  op.  cit.,  II,  49  ff. 

»  See  also  Ibid.,  p.  67. 

«  Ibid.,  pp.  65  ff.  *  Ibid.,  p.  73. 


INTRODUCTION  3 

upon  the  conservative  Spenser.  The  popularity  of  Aristotle  in 
1520  is  proved  by  the  daybook  of  John  Dome,  bookseller,  which 
shows  several  sales  in  that  year.^  We  know  that  Aristotle  was 
popular  in  1551,  a  year  or  two  before  Spenser's  birth,  and  in  1598, 
the  year  before  Spenser's  death.  In  1551  a  series  of  lectures  on 
Aristotle  was  delivered  at  Cologne;  and  at  this  same  period,  as 
Roger  Ascham  tells  us,  Aristotle  and  Plato  were  read  by  English 
children,  in  Greek.^  In  1598,  as  the  Stationers'  Register  shows,  there 
was  a  translation  of  Aristotle  into  English.^  Cambridge  University, 
as  Mulcaster  tells  us,  had,  in  the  reign  of  Henry  VIII,  taught  the 
old  axioms  of  Aristotle,  "till  in  process  of  time  good  letters  were 
brought  in."  The  new  course  of  study  included  Mathematics, 
etc.,  "as  also  Aristotle  in  a  new  dress,  and  some  skill  in  the  Greek 
Tongue."*  Another  thing  which  shows  Renaissance  regard  for 
Aristotle  is  the  influence  of  the  Ethics  and  Politics  on  educational 
treatises  and  other  works  of  the  time.  Elyot's  Governour  draws 
freely  upon  Aristotle.  Moreover,  the  author  recommends  that  by 
the  time  the  boy  is  seventeen  years  old  he  shall  have  read  to  him 
moral  philosophy,  especially  Aristotle's  Ethics,  Books  I  and  II,  to 
teach  him  "reason."^  Skelton's  Magnyfycence  shows  Aristotelian 
influence,  as  does  also  Jonson's  Cynthias  Revels.^  Sidney's  Arcadia 
certainly  reflects  Aristotle.  Wilson's  Arte  of  Rhetorique  is  largely 
from  Aristotle.  Ascham's  Schoolmaster  is  strongly  AristoteUan, 
and  Castiglione's  Courtier  is  almost  wholly  from  Aristotle.  This 
is  only  a  little  of  the  evidence  that  could  be  adduced  to  show  how  the 
Renaissance  regarded  Aristotle.  Woodward,  in  his  Education  during 
the  Renaissance,  points  out  that  the  Renaissance  held  "three  sahent 
characteristics"  of  the  perfect  man:  (1)  Aristotle's  ixtyaKo\pvxjLa, 
Magnanimity,  or  Highmindedness;  (2)  Aristotle's  fieyaXoirpeireia, 
or  Magnificence;  and  (3)  Aristotle's  ^pbvrjais.  Prudence,  or  Reason.'^ 

I  Ibid.,  p.  55. 

s  Ibid.,  pp.  74-75. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  373. 

*  "Babees  Book,"  E.E.T.S.,  ed.  Pumivall,  Forewords,  p.  xxidx. 

6  W.  H.  Woodward,  Education  during  the  Renaissance,  Cambridge,  1906,  p.  289. 

'  See  C.  R.  Baskervill,  English  Elements  in  Jonson's  Early  Comedy,  Austin,  Texas, 
1911.  See  also  R.  L.  Ramsay's  edition  of  Skelton's  Magnyfycence,  E.E.T.S.,  pp.  xxxii- 
xxxviii. 

■    '  Pp.  261-62,  Cambridge,  1906. 


4  ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  SPENSER 

Again,  Spenser's  mingling  of  classic  and- sacred  teachings,  most 
notably  in  Book  I,  where  he  treats  Holiness  as  a  moral  virtue, ^  is 
but  another  example  of  how  he  was  influenced  by  his  time.  In  the 
Renaissance  men  came  to  regard  the  great  classical  teachers  almost' 
as  saints.  Church  fathers  and  divines  made  use  of  the  teachings  of 
Plato,  and  especially  of  Aristotle.  As  Jusserand  puts  it,  "Christian 
and  pagan  ideas  mingle;  the  notion  of  sacrilege  fades ;  men  of  culture 
call  the  mass  'Sacra  Deorum';  Pulci  dedicates  his  second  canto  to 
the  'sovereign  Jupiter  crucified  for  us.' "^  And  we  hear  Erasmus  say 
of  the  noble  Socrates,  "I  can  ofttimes  scarcely  refrain  from  saying, 
'Saint  Socrates,  pray  for  us.'"' 

Finally,  the  allegorical  interpretation  which  Spenser  puts  upon 
Homer,  Virgil,  and  others  shows  the  English  poet  in  agreement  with 
his  age.     In  the  letter  to  Raleigh,  Spenser  says: 

I  have  followed  all  the  antique  Poets  historicall,  first  Homere,  who  in  the 
Persons  of  Agamemnon  and  Ulysses  hath  ensampled  a  good  governour  and 
a  vertuous  man,  the  one  in  his  Ilias,  the  other  in  his  Odysseis:  then  Vergil, 
whose  like  intention  was  to  doe  in  the  person  of  Aeneas,  .... 

Erasmus  shows  the  Renaissance  tendency  to  see  allegory  everywhere. 
He  says,  "Homeric  and  Virgilian  poems  will  not  be  of  indifferent 
use  to  thee  if  thou  rememberest  that  they  were  entirely  allegorical."* 
Erasmus  sees  allegory  and  hohness  in  everything — even  in  Horace. 
Elyot  says  that  Homer,  "from  whom  as  from  a  fountain  proceded 
all  eloquence  and  lernyng,"  offered  "instruction  for  poHtic  govern- 
ance of  people."^  Gavin  Douglas  strives  to  discover  the  mysterious 
meaning  which  he  is  sure  is  concealed  in  Virgil's  words.  He  sees  in 
Aeneas  the  "just  perfyte  man."  For  him  each  one  of  Aeneas' 
adventures  holds  a  moral  lesson;  for  what  poets  feign,  he  reasons, 
ever  "bein  full  of  secreyt  onderstanding  under  hyd  sentense  or  figur."^ 
And  Fulke  Greville,  the  intimate  friend  of  Sidney,  is  certain  that 
under  the  poetical  trappings  of  Sidney's  Arcadia  are  concealed  pro- 
found moral  intentions.  He  says,  "In  all  these  creatures  of  his 
making,  his  intent  and  scope  was  to  turn  the  barren  philosophy 


>  Cf.  the  letter  to  Raleigh.  *  Jusserand,  op.  cit.,  II,  8. 
2  Op.  cit.,  II,  15.                                                              '  Ibid.,  p.  68. 

>  Ibid.,  II,  8.  •  Ibid.,  pp.  130  fif. 


INTRODUCTION  5 

precepts  into  pregnant  images  of  life."^  This  Renaissance  outlook 
was  produced  in  some  measure  by  Plato's  practice  of  writing  alle- 
gories. But  Plato  was  rather  hostile  to  poets,  considering  them 
incompetent  to  teach.  This  outlook  comes  really  from  Aristotle, 
who  justifies  not  only  this  outlook  in  general,  but  also  Spenser's 
interpretation  of  Homer  in  particular.  Aristotle  regarded  the  poets 
as  moral  and  political  teachers.  In  fact  he  drew  his  conceptions  in 
the  Ethics  and  Politics  largely  from  the  Greek  poets,  especially  from 
Homer.  Spenser's  conception  that  Homer  is  to  be  interpreted 
allegorically,  and  that  he  represented  in  Agamemnon  "a  good 
governour"  and  in  Ulysses  "a  vertuous  man,"  is  justified  by  Aristotle 
as  follows :  Aristotle,  in  teaching  the  great  central  idea  of  his  moral 
philosophy,  the  idea  that  a  virtue  is  a  mean  between  extremes,  that 
prudence,  or  reason,  is  the  determiner  of  the  mean,  and  that  one 
must  keep  farthest  from  the  more  dangerous  of  the  two  extremes  by 
veering  toward  the  less  dangerous — in  teaching  this,  Aristotle 
quotes  the  advice  given  to  Ulysses  preparatory  to  his  sailing  between 
Scylla  and  Charybdis,  advice  afterward  repeated  and  followed  by 
Ulysses.  The  part  quoted  is  the  admonition  to  Ulysses  to  keep  far 
from  Charybdis,  the  more  dangerous  of  the  two : 

Far  from  this  smoke  and  swell  keep  thou  thy  bark. 

The  account  of  the  Odyssey  shows  that  Ulysses  is  to  take  reason  for 
his  guide,  and  to  shun  Charybdis  by  going  close  to  Scylla.^  Here  is  a 
justification  not  only  for  allegorical  interpretation,  but  also  for  taking 
Ulysses  as  a  representation  of  the  "vertuous  man."  The  case  is 
no  less  clear  for  Agamemnon  as  "a  good  governour."  Nor  is  there 
any  doubt  that  Aristotle  took  Homer  seriously  as  a  teacher  of  politics. 
In  the  Politics  he  is  discussing  the  Lacedemonian  form  of  kingship, 
which  is  held  to  be  a  model.  After  describing  it  he  says,  ''Such  is 
the  evidence  of  Homer.  For  although  Agamemnon  patiently  endured 
reproaches  in  the  assemblies,  when  the  army  was  in  the  field  his 
authority  extended  to  life  and  death.  Thus  his  [Agamemnon's] 
words  are "     Here  he  quotes  Homer.'    Again,  in  a  passage 

•  The  Life  of  the  Renowned  Sir  Philip  Sidney,  London,  1652,  p.  18. 

2  A'^.  Eth.,  ii,  ix,  and  Odyssey,  xii,  especially  219-20.  I  refer  to  and  quote  J.  E.  C. 
Welldon's  translation  of  Aristotle's  Nicomachean  Ethics  and  Politics. 

3  Politics,  Book  IV,  chap.  xiv. 


6  ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  SPENSER 

plainly  implying  that  Agamemnon  had  both  virtue  and  wisdom, 
Aristotle  quotes  the  prayer  which  Homer  puts  into  the  mouth  of 
Agamemnon,  "Would  I  had  ten  such  councillors  as  Nestor."^ 
Yet  again,  in  the  Ethics,  in  the  discussion  of  Friendship,  where  he 
describes  the  three  kinds  of  polities  and  the  kind  of  friendship  appro- 
priate to  each,  Aristotle  illustrates  his  conception  of  the  ideal  king 
by  quoting  Homer.  He  says,  "He  [the  good  king]  treats  his  sub- 
jects well,  as  being  good,  and  as  caring  for  their  welfare,  like  a  shep- 
herd for  the  welfare  of  his  flock,  whence  Homer  called  Agamemnon 
'shepherd  of  the  folk.'"^  Influenced  by  the  Renaissance  tendency 
toward  allegorical  interpretation,  Spenser  would  certainly  regard 
such  passages  as  significant.  Spenser,  whom  Milton  found  "sage 
and  serious,"  whom  Milton  "dared  be  known  to  think  a  better 
teacher  than  Scotus  or  Aquinas, "^  was  thinking  and  doing,  with  the 
added  power  of  genius,  just  what  his  age  was  thinking  and  doing. 

>  Politics,  III,  xvli,  and  Iliad,  x.  224. 
»  N.  Eth.,  VIII,  xiii. 
•  Areopagitica. 


ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  THE  FAERIE  QUEEN E 

In  his  article,  entitled  "Spenser's  'Twelve  Private  Morall  Vertues 
as  Aristotle  hath  Devised,'"  Modern  Philology,  January,  1906, 
Ambassador  Jusserand  undertakes  to  prove  that  Spenser's  solemn 
statement  concerning  the  substance  of  the  whole  Faerie  Queene, 
made  to  the  poet's  friend  and  patron  Sir  Walter  Raleigh,  at  Raleigh's 
request,  as  M.  Jusserand  thinks,  is  "misleading,  every  word  of  it." 
Jusserand  says: 

Spenser's  statement  [in  the  letter  to  Raleigh]  that  he  intends  "to  por- 
traict  in  Arthur,  before  he  was  king,  the  image  of  a  brave  knight,  perfected 
in  the  twelve  private  morall  vertues  as  Aristotle  hath  devised"  is  misleading, 
every  word  of  it.  There  is  no  such  definite  list;  Aristotle's  number  is  not 
twelve,  and  the  virtues  he  studies  are  far  from  being  the  same  as  those  form- 
ing the  basis  of  the  Faerie  Queene.^ 

That  Jusserand's  paper  has  not  been  without  its  influence  was 
shown  in  a  recent  article  by  Professor  Erskine,  of  Columbia  Univer- 
sity. Although  Professor  Erskine  points  out  one  false  step  in  Jusse- 
xand's  argument,  he  accepts  his  conclusion.  In  discussing  "The 
Virtue  of  Friendship  in  the  Faerie  Queene,"  Publications  of  the  Modern 
Language  Association,  XXIII  (1915),  831-50,  Professor  Erskine 
asks,  "Had  Spenser  read  Montaigne,  or  Plutarch,  or  Cicero's  On 
Friendship,  or  Aristotle's  Ethics?"  Replying  to  his  own  question 
he  says,  "He  may  have  read  them  all,  though  M.  Jusserand  has 
taught  us  to  suspect  the  Aristotle."  Again,  Erskine  speaks  of 
Jusserand's  "having  shown  that  Spenser  did  not  get  his  list  of  virtues 
from  Aristotle." 

It  is  the  purpose  of  the  present  paper  to  show  that  not  only 
are  Jusserand's  arguments  faulty,  but  his  conclusion  is  incorrect. 
Jusserand  makes  three  main  arguments:  first,  that  Spenser's  and 
Aristotle's  lists  of  virtues  are  not  the  same  in  number;  second,  that 
they  are  quite  unlike  in  nature;  and,  third,  that  Spenser  actually 
derived  his  virtues,  and  his  ideas  concerning  a  list  of  twelve  virtues, 

»  Modern  Philology,  III,  376. 


8  ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  SPENSER 

from  Lodowick  Bryskett,  who  in  his  Discourse  of  Civil  Life  includes 
a  discussion  of  moral  virtues,  in  which  the  number  twelve  is  men- 
tioned. 

I  shall  reply  to  these  three  main  arguments  in  the  order  in  which 
I  have  stated  them. 

The  first  of  Jusserand's  three  main  arguments,  that  Spenser's 
and  Aristotle's  lists  of  virtues  are  not  the  same  in  number,  falls  into 
three  subdivisions  or  arguments:  first,  that  "Aristotle  draws  nowhere 
any  dogmatic  list  of  virtues";  second,  that  it  is  difficult  to  know  how 
to  count  Aristotle's  virtues;  and,  third,  that  "Aristotle's  number  is 
not  twelve,"  for,  count  his  virtues  as  you  will,  you  cannot  get  the 
number  twelve.     I  take  up  the  last  subdivision  first. 

Jusserand  finds  that  nine  of  Aristotle's  virtues  are  certainly 
virtues,  but  that  there  is  some  doubt  concerning  the  remaining  four : 
Temperance,  or  Self-control;  Shame,  or  Modesty;  Friendship;  and 
Justice.^    Jusserand  says: 

If  we  include  both  [Temperance  and  Modesty]  we  have  a  total  of  eleven; 
if  we  exclude  both,  a  total  of  nine;  if  we  admit  Self-control  alone,  a  total  of 
ten.  Adding  arbitrarily  Justice  and  Friendship,  or  only  one  of  them  .... 
we  should  have  a  total  varying  from  ten  to  thirteen;'^  a  total  of  twelve  being 
perhaps  the  most  arbitrary  of  all  and  the  most  difficult  to  reach.' 

Now,  it  should  be  noted  at  the  outset  that  a  total  of  thirteen  is 
exactly  what  we  want.  Spenser's  total  is  not  twelve.  It  is  thirteen. 
In  his  letter  to  Raleigh,  only  a  short  distance  from  the  assertion  which 
Jusserand  undertakes  to  disprove,  Spenser  makes  the  following 
statement : 

In  the  person  of  Prince  Arthure  I  sette  forth  magnificence*  in  particular, 
which  vertue  for  that  (according  to  Aristotle  and  the  rest)  it  is  the  perfection 
of  all  the  rest,  and  conteineth  in  it  them  all,  therefore,  in  the  whole  course 
I  mention  the  deedes  of  Arthure  applyable  to  that  vertue,  which  I  write  of 
in  that  booke.  But  of  the  xii.  other  vertues,*  I  make  xii.  other  knights  the 
patrones,  for  the  more  variety  of  the  history. 

1  The  fact  that  Spenser  wrote  a  Book  on  each  of  these  four  virtues — see  Faerie  Queene, 
Books  II,  III,  IV,  and  V — might  be  expected  to  throw  some  light  on  whether  Spenser 
counted  them  as  virtues  or  not. 

Hereafter  references  to  book,  canto,  and  stanza  of  the  Faerie  Queene  are  given  with- 
out the  title  of  the  epic. 

'  Italics  mine. 

>  Mod.  Phil.,  III.  374-75. 

*  Italics  mine. 


ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  THE  "FAERIE  QUEEN E"      9 

So  much  for  Jusserand's  point  that  "Aristotle's  number  is  not 
twelve."  Neither  is  Spenser's.  We  may  now  proceed  to  find  what 
is  the  nature  of  Aristotle's  list  of  virtues,  how  Aristotle's  virtues  are 
to  be  counted,  and  how  Spenser  got  his  number  of  virtues. 

In  Book  II,  chap,  vii,  of  the  Nicomachean  Ethics,  Aristotle  dis- 
cusses a  list  of  moral  virtues  or  qualities  essential  to  the  good  man. 
They  are  exactly  twelve  in  number:  (1)  Courage,  (2)  Temperance,  or 
Self-control,  (3)  Liberality,  (4)  Magnificence,  (5)  Highmindedness, 
(6)  the  mean  concerning  Ambition,  (7)  Gentleness,  or  Mansuetude, 
(8)  Truthfulness,  (9)  Wittiness,  or  Jocularity,  (10)  Friendliness,  or 
Courtesy,  (11)  Modesty,  or  Shame,  and  (12)  Righteous  Indignation. 
Concerning  this  discussion  Aristotle  says:  "For  the  present  we  are 
giving  only  a  rough  and  summary  account  [of  the  virtues],  and  that 
is  sufficient  for  our  purpose;  we  will  hereafter  determine  their  char- 
acter more  exactly."^  We  are  promised,  then,  a  careful  discussion 
of  the  moral  virtues  "hereafter."  In  Book  III,  chaps,  ixff.,  Book 
IV,  and  Book  V,  Aristotle  keeps  his  word.  Moreover,  an  introduc- 
tory sentence  and  a  concluding  one  mark  the  limits  of  this  discussion 
of  the  moral  virtues  as  definitely  as  two  milestones.  The  first  two 
sentences  of  III,  ix,  are  as  follows:  "Let  us  then  resume  our  con- 
sideration of  the  several  virtues  and  discuss  their  nature,  the  subjects 
with  which  they  deal,  and  the  way  in  which  they  deal  with  them. 
In  so  doing  we  shall  ascertain  their  number.''^  The  last  sentence  in 
Book  V  unmistakably  closes  the  list  of  moral  virtues:  "This  then 
may  be  taken  as  a  sufficient  description  of  Justice,  and  the  other 
moral  virtues."  Between  these  two  absolutely  definite  limits 
Aristotle  discusses  exactly  twelve  good  qualities  or  desirable  means. 
In  this  careful  consideration  of  the  moral  virtues,  the  same  good 
qualities,  or  desirable  means,  are  listed  as  in  the  less  careful  discussion 
which  precedes  it,  with  one  exception:  in  the  "rough  and  summary 
account"  Righteous  Indignation  is  included.  We  know  from  the 
Rhetoric  that  Aristotle  decided  that  his  discussion  of  this  quahty 
was  false,  as  Envy  and  Malice,  which  he  gave  as  its  extremes,  are 
not    opposites,    but    compatible   and    coexistent.'    In   his   second 

'  My  quotations  are  from  the  translation  by  J.  E.  C.  Welldon. 

» Italics  mine. 

»See  Aristotle's  Rhetoric,  Book  II,  chap.  ix. 


10  ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  SPENSER 

discussion  of  the  moral  virtues,  which  is  to  "  determine  their  character 
more  exactly"  and  "ascertain  their  number,"  he  omits  Righteous 
Indignation  and  adds  Justice,  leaving  the  number  unchanged. 
Surely  there  is  enough  here  to  suggest  the  number  twelve  if  any 
such  suggestion  were  needed. 

But  Jusserand  has  difficulty  in  totalizing  Aristotle's  virtues,  for 
he  finds  it  hard  to  decide  which  ones  are  to  be  counted.  In  the  first 
place,  he  contends  that  ''Some  of  his  virtues  are  only  a  branch  or 

development  of  another  virtue Magnificence  is  only  the  same 

as  [Liberality],  but  practiced  by  the  very  rich,  instead  of  by  the 
moderately  rich,  man."^  Now  it  is  plain  that  Aristotle's  Mag- 
nificence and  Liberality  are  not  the  same.  It  would  be  strange 
indeed  if  they  were,  since  Aristotle  treats  them  as  two  separate 
virtues.  They  are  much  the  same  in  principle,  as  both  imply  being 
free  in  giving  and  spending.  But  practically  they  are  very  different. 
Anyone  who  gives  to  the  right  cause,  at  the  right  time,  in  the  right 
manner,  and  to  the  right  amount,  considering  the  means  of  the  giver, 
and  who  takes  from  right  sources,  is  liberal.^  He  has  to  avoid  the 
extremes  of  illiberality  and  prodigality.  The  magnificent  man,  on 
the  other  hand,  must  avoid  the  extremes  of  meanness  and  vulgar 
display,  or  bad  taste.  He  must  be  a  kind  of  artist.  ''The  magnifi- 
cent man,"  says  Aristotle,  "is  like  a  connoisseur  in  art;  he  has  the 
faculty  of  perceiving  what  is  suitable,  and  of  spending  large  sums  of 

money  with  good  taste With  equal  expenditure  he  will  make 

the  result  more  magnificent."^  And,  as  we  shall  see  later.  Magnifi- 
cence includes  far  more  than  this.  The  poor  widow  who  gave  the 
mites  was  liberal ;  but  the  problems  she  had  to  solve  in  being  so  were 
very  different  from  those  of  a  person  who  is  in  a  position  to  practice 
the  virtue  of  Magnificence  and  wishes  to  do  so. 

Again,  Jusserand  objects,  "Others  ....  are  treated  of  quite 
apart,  at  great  length ;  but  it  is  not  clear  whether,  if  one  wanted  to 
do  what  Aristotle  neglected  to  perform — that  is,  to  tabulate  his 
moral  virtues — these  should,  or  should  not,  be  admitted  in  the  list. 
Such  is  the  case  with  Justice Such  is  the  case  also  with 

1  Mod.  Phil,  III.  374-75. 

2  Nicomachean  Ethics,  IV,  i-iii;   II,  vii. 

'  Ibid.,  IV,  iv-v;  II,  vii;   Magna  Moralia,  I,  26;  and  Elhica  Eudemia,  III,  vi. 


ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  THE  "FAERIE  QUEENS"    11 

Friendship Aristotle   has  treated   them    apart,  and   shown 

that  he  did  not  include  them  in  his  regular  count.  "^ 

Jusserand's  assertion  that  Aristotle  treated  Justice  apart  from 
the  other  moral  virtues  is  a  misinterpretation.  Justice  is  not 
separated  from  the  preceding  discussion  in  Books  III  and  IV;  on 
the  contrary,  it  is  in  the  closest  possible  way  connected  with  it. 
In  Book  IV,  chap,  xiii,  while  discussing  Truthfulness,  Aristotle  says: 
"We  are  not  speaking  of  one  who  is  truthful  in  legal  covenants,  or 
of  all  such  matters  as  lie  within  the  domain  of  justice  and  injustice, 
for  these  would  be  matters  belonging  to  a  different  virtue."  Again, 
the  last  sentence  in  Book  IV  is  as  follows:  "But  let  us  now  proceed 
to  consider  Justice."  Hence,  one  can  no  more  draw  a  line  between 
Books  IV  and  V  than  between  Books  III  and  IV.  Finally,  the  sen- 
tence which  so  clearly  and  definitely  closes  the  discussion  of  the 
moral  virtues  is,  as  we  have  already  seen,  the  last  sentence  in  Book 
V:  "This  then  may  be  taken  as  a  sufficient  description  of  Justice, 
and  the  other  moral  virtues.''  One  virtue.  Friendship,  Aristotle  does 
treat  "apart  at  great  length."  According  to  Jusserand  its  "admis- 
sion into  [Aristotle's]  treatise  is  justified,  not  to  say  excused,  on  the 
plea  that  it  is  either  a  virtue  or  related  to  virtue,  and  that  it  is  most 
necessary  in  life."^    But  it  could  hardly  need  a  better  justification. 

Finally  Jusserand  points  out:  "Some,  admitted  into  the  class 
at  one  part  of  the  work,  are  described  elsewhere  as  doubtfully  belong- 
ing to  it There  is  also  a  chapter  on  Shame  (atScos,  Lat. 

verecundia) ,  though  'it  is  not  correct  to  call  it  a  virtue.'  But 
'neither  is  Self-control,'  adds  Aristotle  in  the  same  chapter."^  Thus 
Jusserand  makes  much  of  showing  that  Aristotle  is  sometimes  uncer- 
tain whether  a  given  one  of  his  desirable  means  is  a  virtue  or  not — 
that  is,  whether  or  not  it  comes  under  a  technical  definition  of  virtue. 
And  then,  strangely  enough,  he  expects  Spenser  to  be  severely 
technical  when  his  master  has  not  been.  But  Aristotle  tells  us 
plainly  in  Book  I,  chap,  i,  of  his  Nicomachean  Ethics,  and  again  in 
Book  II,  chap,  ii,  that  in  a  discussion  on  ethics  scientific]  exactitude 
is  impossible.     He  answers  Jusserand's  objections  some  centuries 

»  Mod.  Phil..  III.  374-75. 
^  Ibid.,  p.  374:. 
«/6id.,  pp.  374-75. 


12  ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  SPENSER 

before  they  were  made.  He  says:  "An  educated  person  will  expect 
accuracy  in  each  subject  only  so  far  as  the  nature  of  the  subject 
allows."^  Jusserand  overlooks  the  important  fact  that  both  Aristotle 
and  Spenser  are  eminently  practical  in  their  aims.  In  Book  II, 
chap,  ii,  Aristotle  says:  "Our  present  study  is  not,  like  other  studies, 
purely  speculative  in  its  intention;  for  the  object  of  our  inquiry  is 
not  to  know  the  nature  of  virtue  but  to  become  ourselves  virtuous, 
as  that  is  the  sole  benefit  which  it  conveys."  Spenser's  statement 
to  Raleigh  of  the  object  he  had  in  writing  the  Faerie  Queene  shows 
the  practical  nature  of  that  work:  "The  general  end  therefore  of  all 
the  book  is  to  fashion  a  gentleman  or  noble  person  in  vertuous  and 
gentle  discipline."^  With  such  a  purpose,  is  it  likely  that  Spenser 
would  stop  to  quibble  over  whether  such  a  quahty  as  Temperance, 
for  example,  does  or  does  not  come  under  a  technical  definition  of 
virtue  ?  What  would  his  gentleman  be  without  it  ?  Is  it  not  reason- 
able that,  in  attempting  to  follow  Aristotle,  Spenser  would  take  all 
of  Aristotle's  desirable  means  or  good  qualities?  Whether  certain 
of  them  come  under  a  technical  definition  of  virtue  or  not,  they  are 
virtues  in  any  practical  sense.  And  Aristotle  himself  regarded  them 
as  such,  as  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  he  discussed  them  as  virtues. 
Besides,  they  are  absolutely  necessary  to  a  system  which  is  to 
"fashion  a  gentleman  or  noble  person"  not  only  in  "vertuous,"  but 
also  in  "gentle,"  discipline. 

This  brings  us  to  a  very  simple  explanation  of  how  Spenser  got 
his  number  of  virtues.  He  simply  took  all  of  Aristotle's  desirable 
means,  or  qualities  essential  to  the  good  man.  Now  Aristotle  dis- 
cussed, all  told,  thirteen  good  qualities,  or  desirable  means,  as  Jusse- 
rand himself  observes.  One  of  these,  as  Jusserand  also  observes,  is 
Magnificence.  Magnificence,  as  we  saw,  Spenser  gives  to  Arthur, 
leaving  exactly  twelve  others.  Clearly,  if  one  of  Aristotle's  virtues 
contains  all  the  others,  his  virtues  might  properly  be  divided  into 
"the  twelve"  and  the  one  which  includes  the  twelve. 

So  much  for  the  number  of  Spenser's  and  Aristotle's  virtues. 
We  come  now  to  Jusserand's  argument  that  "the  nature  of  the 
virtues  considered  by  Spenser  matches  the  Aristotelian  selection 

I  N.  Elh.,  I.  i. 

» Spenser's  Letter  to  Sir  Walter  Raleigh,  included  in  all  editions  of  the  Faerie  Queene. 


ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  THE  "FAERIE  QUEENE"    13 

scarcely  better  than  their  number"^ — a  proposition  which  to  Jusse- 
rand  means  that  the  two  do  not  match  at  all. 

Before  discussing  the  nature  of  Spenser's  virtues,  it  will  be  neces- 
sary to  clear  the  ground  somewhat  by  saying  a  word  about  how  the 
Faerie  Queene  is  to  be  interpreted.  There  is  a  notion  that  Spenser's 
episodes  are  unimportant.  For  example,  Jusserand  disposes  of  the 
lesson  of  one  of  Spenser's  great  cantos  by  saying,  "It  is  only  inci- 
dentally dwelt  upon,  forming  the  episode  of  Guyon's  visit  to  Medina, 
Bk.  II,  c.  2. "2  And  in  this  attitude  toward  the  episodes  Jusserand 
is  by  no  means  alone.  Any  notion  that  whatever  is  not  a  part  of 
Spenser's  main  plot  can  have  little  to  do  with  his  meaning  is  based 
upon  a  misconception  of  the  fundamental  structure  of  Spenser's 
great  poem.  An  episode  filling  one  of  Spenser's  cantos — a  great 
poem  in  itself — such  as  the  one  in  which  Guyon  is  taken  by  his  Palme-i 
(Reason  or  Prudence)  to  the  house  of  Medina  (the  Mean),  where  the 
Knight  of  Temperance  learns  the  fundamental  conception  of  true 
Temperance,  cannot  be  considered  unimportant.  Such  an  episode 
may  be  "only  incidental"  to  some  of  the  points  named  in  Spenser's 
letter  to  Raleigh,  in  which  the  author  undertakes  to  state  the  "gen- 
eral intention"  and  to  give  something  of  the  plot  and  plan  of  more 
than  half  a  million  words,  and  to  propose  and  name  the  contents  of 
a  second  poem,  which  would  probably^  have  contained  another  half 
million  words,  all  in  a  four-page  letter — a  summary  which  disposes 
of  the  whole  of  the  Book  on  Temperance  in  six  lines.  But  in  Spenser's 
development  of  any  given  virtue,  such  an  episode  is  of  very  great 
importance. 

It  is  mainly  by  means  of  the  episodes  that  Spenser's  discussion 
of  the  virtues  is  carried  on.  This  fact  will  become  clear  as  we  pro- 
ceed. We  may  note  here,  however,  Spenser's  direct  testimony  that 
his  episodes  are  organic.  In  the  Book  on  Courtesy,  at  the  end  of  a 
three-canto  episode  showing  Calidore's  Courtesy  among  the  lowly, 
Spenser  makes  it  unmistakably  clear  that  each  episode  in  the  Faerie 

I  Mod.  Phil., 111,375. 

» Ibid.,  p.  381,  and  note. 

3  It  will  be  observed  that  Spenser  does  not  say  how  many  Books  will  be  in  the  second 
part;  he  speaks  only  of  "these  first  twelve  bookes"  and  of  "the  other  part."  Nor  does 
he  give  the  number  of  the  political  virtues.  Aristotle  gives  nowhere  a  list  of  the  political 
virtues. 


34  ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  SPENSER 

Queene  represents  some  phase  of  the  virtue  under  discussion;  that 
the  author  "never  is  astray."^  Again,  in  the  Book  on  Justice,  in 
introducing  the  account  of  the  spousal  of  Florimel,  Spenser  assures 
us  that  he  is  admitting  to  the  poem  nothing  save  what  "with  this 
present  treatise  doth  agree.  True  vertue  to  advance. "^  And  the 
episode  turns  out  to  be  a  study  in  just  distribution  of  honors,  which 
according  to  Aristotle  is  the  essence  of  Justice.' 

Moreover,  Spenser  does  not  intend  that  his  readers  shall  mis- 
understand him.  "By  certaine  signes  here  set  in  sundry  place,"*  he 
aims  to  see  to  it  that  the  reader  "never  is  astray."  And  among  the 
most  helpful  of  these  "signes"  are  the  very  illuminating  comments 
of  the  author,  oftenest  at  the  beginning,  but  sometimes  in  the  middle 
of  a  canto.^  No  one  will  need  to  be  reminded  of  the  importance  of 
Spenser's  arguments  to  the  cantos  and  his  proems  to  the  books. 
Sometimes  a  few  lines  spoken  by  one  of  the  characters  throw  great 
light  on  the  allegory  of  the  poem.®  Professor  Greene  has  truly 
remarked,  "Only  a  man  of  abundant  leisure  can  read  the  [Faerie 
Queene]  as  Spenser  would  have  it  read."''  To  get  the  meaning,  one 
must  watch  not  only  the  enveloping  plot  and  the  episodes,  but  also 
every  comment,  every  speech,  every  line,  every  word,  and,  frequently, 
in  the  case  of  proper  names,  every  syllable.  He  must  read  the  poem 
intensively — minutely : 

ne  let  him  then  admire, 
But  yield  his  sence  to  be  too  blunt  and  bace. 
That  no'te  without  an  hound  fine  footing  trace.* 

So  much  for  the  manner  in  which  Spenser  is  to  be  interpreted. 
Let  us  now  examine,  in  the  case  of  each  of  the  six  virtues  developed 
by  Spenser,  Jusserand's  argument  that  Spenser's  and  Aristotle's 
virtues  are  unlike  in  nature. 

»VI,  xii.  1-2.     Cf.I.vu,50;  II,  xii,  1;  Ill.vi,  52;  VI.iii.25;  Vl.ix,  1. 
»  V,  iii,  3. 

•  With  this  canto  of  Spenser's  Book  on  Justice,  cf.  N.  Eth.,  V,  ii,  and  V,  iv,  and 
Politics,  II,  vii.     With  Braggadocchio  cf .  Achilles'  Coward,  Politics,  II,  vii. 

•  Book  II,  Proem,  stanza  4. 

'  See  I,  viii,  1,  or  I,  x,  1.     Other  examples  will  be  pointed  out  later. 

•  See,  for  example,  I,  vlii,  49. 

»  H.  L.  Greene,  "Allegory  in  Spenser,  Bunyan,  and  Swift,"  Pub.  Mod.  Lang.  Assoc, 
IV  (1889),  181. 


ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  THE  "FAERIE  QUEENE"    15 

Concerning  the  subject  of  Spenser's  first  Book,  Jusserand  says: 
"Holiness  is  certainly  not  borrowed  from  Aristotle's  series  of  moral 
virtues."^  This  is  mere  assertion,  not  argument.  Possibly  an  argu- 
ment is  thought  to  he  in  a  supposed  inconsistency  between  "holi- 
ness" and  "moral  virtues";  but  if  so,  it  should  be  remembered  that 
Spenser  certainly  classed  holiness  as  a  moral  virtue,  as  is  shown  not 
only  by  the  letter  to  Raleigh  but  also  by  the  "XII.  Morall  vertues" 
of  the  title-page  of  the  Faerie  Queene. 

Again,  Jusserand  says  that  Spenser's  reference  to  the  twelve 
moral  virtues  of  Aristotle  was  "a  mere  afterthought,  probably, 
imagined  after  part  of  the  poem  had  been  written ;  for  Spenser  begins 
with  the  virtue  of  Holiness,  conspicuously  absent  as  we  saw  from 
Aristotle's  enurneration,"  etc.^  Surely  it  is  incredible  that  Spenser 
should  contemplate  a  great  epic  for  years  (see  Spenser's  letter  to 
Harvey  under  date  of  1580)  and  finally  write  the  forty-five  thousand 
words  of  the  Book  on  Holiness  without  even  a  general  notion  of  the 
plot  and  purpose  of  his  poem.  Besides,  the  fact  that  the  machinery 
of  the  court  of  Gloriana  and  of  the  quests  is  introduced  at  the  very 
beginning  of  Book  I'  indicates  that  the  plan  of  the  letter  to  Raleigh 
was  not  an  "afterthought."  But  even  if  we  were  to  admit  that  the 
reference  to  Aristotle  was  an  afterthought,  conceived  after  the  first 
Book  was  written,  it  would  have  to  fit,  at  least  approximately. 
And  Book  I,  Holiness,  was  one  of  the  three  which  accompanied  the 
letter  to  Raleigh.  How  could  Spenser  say  that  each  of  the  twelve 
Books  of  the  Faerie  Queene  would  contain  one  of  Aristotle's  twelve 
moral  virtues,  "of  which  these  three  bookes  contayn  three,"*  when 
the  first  of  the  three  had  nothing  whatever  to  do  with  Aristotle? 
Could  he  expect  to  deceive  Raleigh,  Sidney,  Elizabeth,  and  the  rest 
of  the  brilliant  circle  for  whom  he  wrote  ? 

Obviously  Jusserand  misunderstands,  or  has  forgotten,  the  mean- 
ing of  Aristotle's  virtue  of  Highmindedness,  or  Magnanimity;  for 
he  sees  in  it  only  "a  kind  of  ornament  applicable  to  all  the  virtues."* 
It  is  well  known  that  this  virtue  represents  Aristotle's  conception  of 

»  Mod.  Phil..  III.  376. 

*Ibid.,  p.  381. 

» I,  i.     See  also  canto  vii,  stanza  46. 

« Letter  to  Raleigh. 

'  Mod.  Phil.,  Ill,  382. 


16  ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  SPENSER 

absolute  moral  perfection.  "The  highminded  man,"  says  Aristotle, 
"seems  to  be  one  who  thinks  himself  worthy  of  great  things,  and  who 
is  worthy  of  them.  For  he  who  thinks  himself  worthy  of  great  things  ,^ 
without  being  so  is  foolish,  and  no  virtuous  person  is  foolish  orabsurd."  \ 
"There  will  be  one  particular  object  of  his  interest  ....  honor." 
"  Highmindedness,  then,  has  to  do  with  honor  on  a  great  scale." 
"The  highminded  man,  as  bein^  worthy  of  the  highest  things,  will 
be  in  the  highest  degree  good."  "  It  seems  that  the. highminded  man 
possesses  such  greatness  as  belongs  to  every  virtue."  "It  seems  that 
Highmindedness  is,  as  it  were,  the  crown  of  the  virtues,  as  it  enhances 
them  and  cannot  exist  apart  from  them."  '^  Finally,  the  following 
sentence  shows  Aristotle's  exalted  conception  of  Highmindedness: 
"He  [the  highminded  man]  will  be  only  moderately  pleased  at  great 
honors  conferred  upon  him  by  virtuous  people,  as  feeling  that  he 
obtains  what  is  naturally  his  due  or  even  less  than  his  due;  for  it  would 
be  impossible  to  devise  an  honor  that  should  be  proportionate  to 
perfect  virtue."^ '  \ 

But  is  the  Knight  of  Holiness  Aristotle's  highminded  man? 
Some  change  in  the  conception  of  the  Red  Cross  Knight  was,  of 
course,  necessary  on  account  of  the  fact  that  he  was  a  Christian  hero. 
So  far  as  possible,  however,  Spenser  has  made  him  conform  to 
Aristotle's  conception  of  Highmindedness.  First,  he  is  characterized 
by  a  high  opinion  of  himself.  For  proof  of  his  amazing  self-confidence 
we  have  not  only  Spenser's  letter  to  Raleigh,  but  also  the  Faerie 
Queene  itself.  "A  tall  clownishe  younge  man"  who  has  never  worn 
armor,^  he  enters  the  court  of  great  Gloriana, 

Where  noblest  knights  were  to  be  found  on  earth, ^ 
and  to  the  great  wonder  of  the  Queen  and  the  disappointment  and 
mortification  of  Una,  whom  he  proposes  to  help,  demands  the  greatest 
of  all  quests,  the  establishment  of  Truth — true  Christianity — and  the 
defeat  of  Error  and  the  Devil,  a  quest  so  difficult  that,  although  great 
knights  from  all  over  the  world  have  tried  it,  none  has  been  able  to 
fulfil  it.*  Assuredly  he  thinks  himself  worthy  of  great  things.  But 
he  not  only  thinks  himself  worthy;  he  is  worthy — as  is  abundantly 
proved,  not  alone  by  his  ability  to  wear  the  Christian  armor,  which 

>  For  Aristotle's  discussion  of  Highmindedness  see  Nicomachean  Ethics,  IV,  vii  fit. 
«  Letter  to  Raleigh,  and  F.Q..  I.  i.  1.  '  I.  iii.  28.  ♦  I.  vii.  45. 


ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  THE  "FAERIE  QUEENE"    17 

is  the  test,^  nor  by  Una's  later  testimony  concerning  his  great  work,'^ 
but  also  by  his  final  triumph  over  all  enemies  including  the  Dragon 
of  Evil.^  In  the  second  place,  his  chief  thought  is  the  winning  of 
great  earthly  honor.  His  "noble  heart"  is  "with  child  of  glorious 
great  intent"  and 

Can  never  rest,  untill  it  forth  have  brought 
Th'  eternal!  brood  of  glorie  excellent.* 

"All  for  prayse  and  honour  he  did  fight. "^  From  first  to  last  the 
Knight  of  Holiness  is  in  pursuit  of  honor.  He  has  come  to  Faerie 
Court  in  the  first  place  to  seek  for  fame : 

prickt  with  courage,  and  thy  forces  pryde. 
To  Faery  court  thou  cam'st  to  seeke  for  fame.? 

Upon  our  first  introduction  to  him,  at  the  beginning  of  the  Faerie 
Queene,  we  are  told : 

Upon  a  great  adventure  he  was  bond, 
That  greatest  Gloriana  to  him  gave, 
That  greatest  Glorious  Queene  of  Faerie  lond, 
To  winne  him  worship,  and  her  grace  to  have. 
Which  of  all  earthly  things  he  most  did  crave.'' ' 

And  when  he  appears  in  the  third  Book,  after  he  has  attained  perfect 
Holiness,  his  character  in  this  respect  is  unchanged: 

Then  he  forth  on  his  jom-ney  did  proceede, 
To  seeke  adventures,  which  mote  him  befall. 
And  win  him  worship  through  his  warlike  deed. 
Which  alwayes  of  his  paines  he  made  the  chiefest  meed.^ 

Nor  does  the  Red  Cross  Knight  seek  merely  great  honor;  he  seeks 
the  greatest  of  all  earthly  honor.  Una  tells  him  that  his  fight  with 
the  Dragon  of  Evil 

shall  ye  evermore  renowmed  make, 
Above  all  knights  on  earth,  that  batteill  undertake.^ 

>  Letter  to  Raleigh.  *  I,  v,  1. 

2 1,  vii.  47-49.  s  I.  V.  7. 

» I.  xi.  •  I.  X,  66. 

'  I,  i,  3.  Italics  in  quotations  from  Spenser  are  all  mine.  I  quote  from  Smith  and 
De  Selincourt's  Poetical  Works  of  Spenser,  Oxford,  1912,  but  I  have  disregarded  the 
italicization  of  proper  names  and  followed  modern  usage  in  regard  to  u,  v,  and  j. 

•  III,  iv,  4. 

»I.  xi.  2. 


18  ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  SPENSER 

And  Heavenly  Comtemplation  has  already  told  him  what  this  great 
honor  is  to  be.  The  knight  is  to  be  Saint  George,  famous  throughout 
Europe  as  a  military  saint,  and  the  patron  saint  of  England : 

For  thou  emongst  those  Saints,  whom  thou  doest  see, 
Shalt  be  a  Saint,  and  thine  owne  nations  frend 
And  Patrone:  thou  Saint  George  shalt  called  bee, 
Saint  George  of  mery  England,  the  signe  of  victoree.^ 

Finally,  that  the  Red  Cross  Knight's  Highmindedness  may  be  com- 
plete and  convincing  in  Spenser's  and  Aristotle 's^  view,  Heavenly 
Contemplation  explains  that  the  knight  is  of  high  birth — 

thou  springst  from  ancient  race 
Of  Saxon  kings.^ 

And  we  know  that  it  is  by  deliberate  plan,  not  by  accident,  that 
Spenser  makes  the  Red  Cross  Knight's  one  great  passion  love  of 
honor.  Even  Heavenly  Contemplation  sanctions  the  knight's  pur- 
suit of  earthly  fame.*    And  the  poet,  in  his  own  person — 

That  I  this  man  of  God  his  godly  armes  may  blaze* — 
prays  aid  of 

The  Nourse  of  time,  and  everlasting  fame 

That  warlike  hands  ennoblest  with  immortall  name.^ 

The  moral  perfection  which  the  knight  attains  is,  no  doubt,  to  be 

expected : 

from  the  first  unto  the  last  degree,  ^ 

His  mortall  life  he  learned  had  to  frame 
In  holy  righteousnesse,  without  rebuke  or  blame.^ 

It  is  not  to  be  overlooked  that  all  of  Spenser's  great  knights  are 
characterized  by  Highmindedness,  as  they  are  by  all  of  the  other 
moral  virtues.  This  is  in  accordance  with  Aristotle's  tendency  to 
make  any  given  virtue  include  all  the  others,  and  his  teaching  that 
"Neither  greatness  nor  highmindedness  is  possible  without  complete 
virtue."^  But  although,  on  account  of  this  close  relation  between 
the  virtues,  such  great  knights  as  Guyon  and  Artegall  are  character- 
ized by  Highmindedness,  none  of  Spenser's  knights,  except  possibly 

»I,  X.  61. 

2  This  statement  is  warranted  not  only  by  Aristotle's  and  Spenser's  strong  feeling 
of  aristocracy,  but  also  by  Aristotle's  discussion  of  Highmindedness  in  N.  Eth.,  IV,  viii. 
» I,  X.  65.  •  I.  xi,  5. 

« I,  X,  59,  60,  and  62.  '  I,  x,  45. 

«I.  xi.  7.  i  N.  Eth.,rf.vm.. 


ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  THE  "FAERIE  QUEENE"    19 

the  all-perfect  Arthur,  can  compare  in  Highmindedness  with  the 
Knight  of  Holiness.  That  especial  emphasis  should  be  laid  on 
Arthur's  Highmindedness  would  naturally  result  not  only  from  the 
close  relation  between  the  virtues,  but  also  from  Arthur's  moral 
perfection.  But  it  is  in  Book  I,  where  Arthur  tells  his  dream  of 
glory,  that  we  are  most  impressed  with  his  Highmindedness.  And 
according  to  Spenser's  plan  in  the  letter  to  Raleigh,  Arthur  must,  in 
the  Book  on  Holiness,  represent  the  same  virtue  as  the  Knight  of 
Holiness:  "In  the  whole  course  I  mention  the  deedes  of  Arthure 
apply  able  to  that  vertue,  which  I  write  of  in  that  booke."  Con- 
sequently, if  Arthur  represents  Highmindedness  in  Book  I,  so 
must  the  Knight  of  the  Red  Cross.  Thus  it  is  clear  that  the  Knight 
of  Holiness  exemplifies  Aristotle's  virtue  of  Highmindedness.  Nor 
was  Spenser  doing  anything  unusual  in  thus  combining  pagan  and 
sacred  writings.  He  was  only  doing  what  many  divines  did  both 
before  and  after  him.  Moreover,  he  was  only  doing  what  he  himself 
did  again  and  again  in  the  Faerie  Queene,  sometimes  in  a  rather  sur- 
prising fashion.  For  example,  in  II,  xii,  52,  he  compares  Acrasia's 
Bower,  falsely  named  the  "Bowre  of  blis,"  not  only  to  "Parnasse" 
and  Mount  Ida,  but  also  to  the  Garden  of  Eden,  the  comparison 
being  unfavorable  even  to  Eden.  Again,  the  marriage  rites  of  Una 
and  the  Knight  of  Holiness,  described  in  I,  xii,  are  pagan,  not  Chris- 
tian.^ There  is  nothing  surprising,  however,  in  his  combining 
Aristotle's  Highmindedness  with  Christianity;  for  the  combination 
is  simply  moral  perfection  (represented  by  the  Knight  of  Holiness) 
married  to  Christian  truth  (Una). 

I  have  discussed  the  case  of  Holiness  at  considerable  length 
because  it  is  the  only  one  which  is  in  any  way  doubtful.  In  Books 
II-VI  it  is  certain  that  Spenser  is  consciously  and  deliberately 
foll^ying  Aristotle. 

The  subject  of  Spenser's  second  Book  is  Temperance.  Jusserand 
has  to  admit  that  "  [Spenser's  virtue  of]  Temperance  truly  and  plainly 
corresponds  to  one  of  Aristotle's  [virtues]. "^  Aristotle  outlines 
Temperance  briefly  in  the  Nicomachean  Ethics,  II,  vii,  discusses  it  at 
some  length  in  III,  xiii-xv,  and  continues  the  discussion  throughout 

«  See  I,  xii.  37. 

»  Mod.  Phil.,  III.  376. 


20  ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  SPENSER 

most  of  Book  VII.  Spenser,  in  his  Book  on  Temperance,  draws  upon 
all  three  discussions. 

Concerning  the  virtue  of  Spenser's  third  Book,  Jusserand  says: 
"Chastity  may  be  held  to  have  been  [one  of  Aristotle's  virtues],  if  we 
give  the  word  the  sense  of  'shame'  (verecundia) ,  and  neglect  the  fact 
that  Aristotle,  while  studying  it,  declares  that  this  'shame'  is  not  a 
virtue."*  That  both  Spenser  and  Aristotle  were  interested  in  prac- 
tical morality,  not  in  whether  such  qualities  as  Temperance  and 
Chastity  are  technically  virtues,  we  have  already  seen.  Although 
Aristotle  tends  to  make  this  virtue  of  Shame,  or  Modesty,  all- 
inclusive,  just  as  he  tends  to  make  all  the  others,  his  discussion  of  it 
in  the  Nicomachean  Ethics^  and  in  the  Rhetoric^  leaves  unquestionable 
the  fact  that  he  means  it  particularly  to  apply  to  sex  morality.  It  is 
hardly  necessary  to  state  that  in  his  Book  on  Chastity  Spenser  is 
discussing  sex  morality  from  the  standpoint  of  Shame,  or  Modesty, 
on  the  one  hand,  and  Shamelessness,  on  the  other.^  It  should  be 
added  that  sex  morality  is  also  an  important  part  of  Aristotle's  dis- 
cussion of  Temperance,  including  Licentiousness  and  Incontinence. 
AristoteUan  Temperance,  in  the  strict  or  particular  sense,  applies  to 
"meats"  and  "drinks"  and  "what  are  called  the  pleasures  of  love."^ 
Aristotelian  Shame,  or  Modesty,  in  the  strict  sense,  applies,  of  course, 
to  the  last  of  these.  Spenser,  in  his  Book  on  Chastity,  drew  not 
only  upon  Aristotle's  discussion  of  Shame,  or  Modesty,  but  also  upon 
that  part  of  his  discussion  of  Temperance  and  Incontinence  which 
deals  with  sex  morality. 

Concerning  the  subjects  of  Spenser's  fourth  and  fifth  Books, 
Jusserand  says:  "The  reader  knows  what  the  case  is  with  Friendship 
and  Justice."®    I  believe  he  does. 

Finally,  concerning  Courtesy,  the  subject  of  Spenser's  sixth  Book, 
Jueserand  says:  "Courtesy  may  be  held  to  correspond,  if  to  any- 
thing, to  Aristotle's  friendliness,  but  not  without  a  considerable 

>  Mod.  PAii.,  III.  376. 
2  N.  Eth.,  II,  vu;   IV.  XV. 

•  Rhetoric,  II,  vi.  xii.  and  xiii. 

•  See.  for  example.  III.  i,  48.  See  also.  Ill,  i,  50;  III.  ii.  40-41;  III,  iv.  45;  III.  v, 
55;  III,  vii,49;  III,vlii,  32;  and  III.  xii.  24. 

»  N.  Eth.,  III.  xiii. 

•  Mod.  Phil.,  III.  376. 


ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  THE  "FAERIE  QUEENE"    21 

extension  and  modernization  of  the  word Aristotle's  descrip- 
tion of  friendliness  best  suits,  however,  without  matching  it  exactly, 
the  modern  notion  of  courtesy."^  The  New  English  Dictionary 
reveals  nothing  inconsistent  in  Spenser's  discussing  under  the  name 
of  Courtesy  the  virtue  which  Aristotle  says  is  most  like  Friendliness. 
But  what  really  counts,  a  comparison  of  Spenser's  Book  on  Courtesy 
with  this  Near-Friendliness,  shows  that  the  two  really  do  match. 
The  sphere  of  Aristotle's  Near-Friendliness  is  "human  society,  with 
its  common  life  and  association  in  words  and  deeds."  The  virtue 
is  a  mean  between  flattery,  obsequiousness,  complaisance,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  surliness,  disagreeableness,  contentiousness,  on  the  other. 
Aristotle  says:  "It  most  resembles  Friendliness;  for  the  person 
in  whom  it  exists  answers  to  our  idea  of  a  virtuous  friend,  except 

that   friendliness   includes   affection   as   well He   will   so 

act  alike  to  strangers  and  acquaintances,"  etc.^  Thus  Aristotle's 
Near-Friendliness  is  a  kind  of  Golden  Rule :  In  your  association  with 
others,  including  strangers,  speak  to  them  and  act  toward  them  as  a 
virtuous  friend  would  do. 

Spenser's  virtue  of  Courtesy  matches  this  Aristotelian  ideal 
exactly.  It  allows  neither  flattery,  on  the  one  hand,  nor  conten- 
tiousness, on  the  other.^  It  consists  in  acting  toward  others  as  a 
virtuous  friend  would  act.  It  should  be  remembered,  however,  that 
with  both  Aristotle  and  Spenser  friendship  includes  love;  and  also 
that,  in  accordance  with  Aristotle's  and  Spenser's  tendency  to  make 
any  given  virtue  include  all  the  others,  Courtesy  and  Discourtesy 
will  include  other  virtues  and  vices. 

For  seldome  yet  did  living  creature  see. 
That  curtesie  and  manhood  ever  disagree.'* 

That  the  virtue  of  Spenser's  sixth  Book  does  consist  in  acting  toward 
others  as  a  true  friend  would  act  is  shown  by  the  characters  and  the 
episodes.  Calidore,  Tristram,  Calepine,  Prince  Arthur,  and  others 
represent  Courtesy,  or  Friendliness.  Maleffort,  Crudor,  and  Briana, 
who  maltreat  strangers  (c.  i.) ;  the  "proud  discourteous  knight"  whom 
Tristram  slays  (c.  ii);  the  contemptible  Sir  Turpine,  who  will  not 

>  Ibid. 

2  N.  Eth.,  IV.  xii. 

'  See,  for  example,  Spenser's  exposition  of  Calidore's  Courtesy  in  VI,  1,  2-3. 

«VI.  iii,  40. 


22  ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  SPENSER 

give  lodging  to  Calepine  and  his  wounded  lady,  or  help  the  wounded 
woman  over  the  ford,  and  who  even  attacks  the  defenseless  knight 
(c.  iii,  vi,  viii) ;  Mirabella,  who  delights  in  the  sufferings  of  her  lovers 
(c.  vii);  the  "salvage  nation,"  which  preys  upon  strangers  (c.  viii, 
stanzas  35  &.);  and  the  "theeves"  who  lead  Pastorell  into  captivity 
(c.  ix,  xi) — these  are  some  of  the  examples  of  Unfriendliness,  of  not 
acting  toward  others  as  a  virtuous  friend  would  act.  And,  finally, 
the  Blatant  Beast  is  not  Slander,  as  it  is  sometimes  named,  nor  yet 
the  Puritans,  as  it  is  oftenest  named.  It  is  the  Spirit  of  Unfriendli- 
ness;^ it  is  Mahce,  Malevolence,  Envy,  Despite,  Slander,  Conten- 
tiousness, and  is  represented  in  one  place,^  no  doubt,  by  the  most 
contentious  element  among  the  Puritans.  The  Blatant  Beast,  Uke 
Duessa, 

could  d'on  so  manie  shapes  in  sight. 
As  ever  could  cameleon  colours  new.' 

Besides,  Spenser  more  than  once  shows  by  the  speeches  of  his  char- 
acters, combined  with  the  plot,  that  he  is  keeping  before  him  Aris- 
totle's ideal  of  acting  toward  others  as  a  true  friend  would  act.  For 
example,  in  VI,  iii,  15,  Aldine  is  talking  to  Sir  Calidore,  the  Knight 
of  Courtesy.  The  two  are  strangers,  having  seen  each  other  but 
once  before.     We  are  told: 

In  th'end  his  [Calidore's]  kyndly  courtesie  to  prove. 

He  [Aldine]  him  by  all  the  bands  of  love  besought, 

And  as  it  mote  a  faithfull  friend  behove, 

To  safeconduct  his  love,  and  not  for  ought 

To  leave,  till  to  her  fathers  house  he  had  her  brought. 

After  attempting  to  show  that  the  virtues  of  Spenser's  six^  Books 
are  not  the  ones  discussed  by  Aristotle,  Jusserand  contends  that 

'  With  V,  xii,  28-43,  and  VI,  i,  7-10,  in  which  passages  the  Blatant  Beast  is  identified 
with  Envy  and  Detraction,  the  latter  including  Malevolence,  and  with  VI,  v,  12-22,  in 
which  the  Blatant  Beast  is  identified  with  Malice,  Deceit,  and  Detraction,  compare  the 
author's  comment,  or  literal  exposition  of  Discourtesy,  in  VI,  vii,  1-2. 

2  See  VI,  xii,  22-41;  but  note  in  VI,  xii,  22  and  23,  that  the  Blatant  Beast  has  gone 
"  through  every  place"  and  "  through  all  estates,"  all  ranks  of  life,  before  he  comes  to  the 
"Clergy." 

'  IV,  i.  18. 

« M.  Jusserand  holds  that  the  fragment  called  Book  VII  is  not  a  part  of  the  F.Q. 
Therefore,  he  does  not  discuss  it.  My  discussion  of  it  will  be  found  in  the  next  section 
of  this  thesis. 


ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  THE  "FAERIE  QUEENE"    23 

Spenser's  and  Aristotle's  virtues  are  unlike  in  that  Aristotle  treats 
all  his  virtues  as  means  between  extremes,  even  straining  absurdly 
to  do  so,  whereas  Spenser  treats  only  one  of  his,  Temperance,  as  a 
mean,  and  it  "  only  incidentally."^  He  admits  that,  "  Either  through 
direct  or  indirect  borrowings,  [Spenser]  took  from  [Aristotle]  his 
notion  of  the  middle  or  virtuous  state,  standing  between  two  faulty 
extremes."  But  he  adds,  "He  did  not  try,  as  Aristotle  did,  to 
apply  this  theory  to  every  virtue.  It  is  only  incidentally  dwelt  upon, 
forming  the  episode  of  Guyon's  visit  to  Medina,  Book  II,  c.  2."^ 
This  point  is  important;  for  Jusserand's  criticism  means  that 
Spenser  ignored,  almost  completely,  Aristotle's  fundamental  con- 
ception of  what  a  virtue  is — ignored  what  is  the  most  important  and 
characteristic  thing  about  Aristotle's  moral  philosophy.  Let  us  see 
if  he  did. 

Expressed  in  terms  of  method,  Aristotle's  moral  philosophy  is 
essentially  this:  (1)  He  develops  a  virtue  by  showing  its  opposites, 
and  by  discussing  various  phases  of  the  virtue  and  of  its  opposites.' 
He  treats  a  virtue  as  a  mean  between  two  extremes;*  but  he  dis- 
cusses various  phases  of  the  mean  and  of  its  extremes,  and  he  tends 
to  make  any  given  virtue  include  all  the  others;^  so  that  his  virtues 
become  a  kind  of  center  surrounded  by  many  opposites.®  (2)  He 
gives  great  emphasis  to  what  he  calls  "the  opposite"  of  a  virtue,  and 
says  less,  and  in  some  cases  almost  nothing,  about  the  other  extreme, 
for  his  mean  is  not  arithmetical;  one  who  aims  at  the  mean,  he  says, 
must,  like  Ulysses,  keep  farthest  from  Charybdis,  the  more  danger- 
ous of  the  two  extremes.''  And  (3)  he  makes  Reason  the  determiner  f 
of  the  right  course  in  the  case  of  each  of  the  moral  virtues.* 

Such  is  the  essence  of  Aristotle's  moral  philosophy.  If,  as  Jusse- 
rand  contends,  Spenser  ignores  one  of  these  principles,  he  is  certainly 
not  following  Aristotle.     If,  as  I  shall  undertake  to  prove,  he  applies 

»  Mod.  Phil,  III,  374.  381,  and  note. 

s  Ibid.,  381,  and  note. 

>SeeN.  Eth.,lU,ixfl.;  IV;  andV.     See  also  II.  vii. 

« See  his  definition  of  virtue  "regarded  in  its  essence  or  theoretical  conception," 
N.  Eth.,  II,  vi.     See  also  II.  ^-iii. 

'  See  his  explanation  of  his  definition  of  virtue,  N.  Eth.,  VI,  especially  chaps,  i  and 
xiii. 

>  See  N.  Eth..  II,  v.  and  II.  ix. 

'  See  N.  Eth.,  II,  ix.  »  Ibid.,  11,  vk-Tx  v      vL?  s- 


24  ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  SPENSER 

all  of  these  principles  in  his  treatment  of  the  virtues,  he  certainly 
does  follow  Aristotle,  at  least  in  essentials. 

Spenser  certainly  develops  the  virtue  of  Holiness  bj''  showing  its 
opposites,  and  by  presenting  various  phases  of  the  virtue  pnd  of  its 
opposites.  He  represents  Holiness  by  the  Knight  of  Holiner^s  (High- 
mindedness,  moral  perfection),  Una  (Christian  Truth),  Faith,  Hope, 
and  Charity,  Heavenly  Contemplation,  and  so  on ;  and  around  these 
he  groups  Paganism,  or  Infidelity,  "Blind  Devotion"^  (Corceca),  Mo- 
nastic Superstition  (Abessa),  "Hypocrise"^  (Archimago),  Falsehood 
(Duessa,  "faire  Falsehood"^),  False  Pride  or  Conceit  (Orgoglio  and 
Lucifera),  the  Seven  Deadly  Sins  and  all  the  other  vices.  Error  (the 
Dragon  of  Error  in  the  first  canto),  and  Satan  (in  Lucif era's  train, 
and  the  Dragon  of  Evil  in  canto  xi). 

Moreover,  he  represents  the  virtue  as  a  mean  between  extremes 
and  emphasizes  one  extreme.  Paganism,  represented  by  the  Paynim 
brethren  Sansfoy  (Unbelief),  Sansjoy  (Joylessness),  and  Sansloy 
(Lawlessness),  is  certainly  one  extreme  in  regard  to  Holiness.  The 
opposite  extreme  is  represented  by  Corceca  ("Blind  Devotion"), 
Abessa  (Monastic  Superstition),  and  the  Satyrs  who  worship  even 
Una's  ass.  Corceca  is  an  ignorant,  blind  old  woman  who  says 
thirty-six  hundred  prayers  every  day.  She  dares  not  stop  mumbling 
her  prayers.  Abessa  is  her  daughter.  Again,  the  Knight  of  Holi- 
ness is  a  mean  between  sinful  "joyaunce"  and  joyless  faith  and 
abstinence,  though  it  costs  him  hard  fighting  to  keep  to  this  mean. 
After  he  has  slain  the  Paynim  Sansfoy  (canto  ii),  he  successfully 
resists  (canto  iv)  the  temptation  to  join  with  Duessa  in  the  "joy- 
aunce"  of  the  gay  party  composed  of  the  Seven  Deadly  Sins.  But 
immediately  after  he  has  resisted  the  joyance  of  sin,  he  is  attacked 
by  the  Paynim  Sansjoy,  who  proposes  to  cancel  his  victory  over 
Sansfoy  by  taking  away  the  shield  which  is  the  emblem  of  his  victory.* 
He  is  least  fortified  on  the  side  of  Joylessness ;  we  are  told  upon  our 
first  introduction  to  him  that  "of  his  cheere  [he]  did  seeme  too  solemne 
sad."^    Accordingly,  the  battle  which  ensues  with  Sansjoy  is  one  of 


>  I.  iil,  Arg.  ■■'  I,  i.  Arg.  '  I.  ii.  Arg. 

*  For  the  joyfulnoss  of  Faith  see  Spenser's  description  of  Faith  (Fidelia)  in  canto  x, 
especially  stanzas  12-14. 
'    .  i.  2. 


ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  THE  "FAERIE  QUEENE"    25 

the  hardest  of  his  career.^  Once  more  the  Knight  of  Holiness  is,  as 
we  have  already  seen,  Aristotle's  mean  of  Highmindedness.  He 
thinks  himself  worthy  of  great  things  and  is  worthy  of  them;  he 
neither  overestimates  nor  underestimates  his  own  worth — he  is 
neither  conceited  nor  meanminded.  Arthur  also  represents  this 
mean  of  Highmindedness.  He  thinks  himself  worthy  of  great  honor, 
and  is  worthy  of  it.  He  aspires  to  the  hand  of  great  Gloriana  (Glory) , 
but  we  know,  not  only  from  his  moral  perfection,  but  also  from  the 
direct  testimony  of  Una  and  the  Knight  of  Holiness,  that  he  is 
worthy  of  her.^  According  to  Aristotle,  the  worst  case  of  Mean- 
mindedness,  one  of  the  two  extremes  in  regard  to  Highmindedness 
is  the  man  of  great  worth  who  underestimates  his  own  deserts — 
cares  too  little  for  honor.  Sir  Satyrane,  in  a  measure,  illustrates  this 
extreme.  We  feel  that  he  is  capable  of  as  great  things  as  Guyon  or 
Calidore.  Yet  he  disappoints  us;  he  does  nothing  supremely  great. 
Although  he  is  possessed  of  great  worth  and  wins  fame — "through 
all  Faery  lond  his  famous  worth  was  blown'" — he  cares  nothing  for 
great  honor.  He  is  not  among  those  who  seek  quests  from  great 
Gloriana, 

That  glorie  does  to  them  for  guerdon  graunt.'* 

To  represent  Conceit,  the  other  main  extreme  in  regard  to  High- 
mindedness, two  characters  are  drawn,  one  masculine  and  one 
feminine.  Orgoglio  (Ital.  orgoglio,  pride;  cf.  Gk.  opyau),  though 
born  of  dirt  and  wind,  and  fostered  by  Ignaro  (Ignorance),  thinks 
himself  very  great.  But  when  he  is  slain  by  the  Knight  of  Holiness, 
his  huge  trunk  collapses  like  a  punctured  bladder,  showing  that  he 
is  puffed  up  with  conceit.  Lucifera  (the  sinful  mistress  of  the  "  house 
of  Pryde"^)  is  excessively  proud  and  supercilious,  though  she  is  only 
the  daughter  of  "Griesly  Pluto"  and  the  "Queene  of  Hell"  and  is 
thoroughly  unworthy  of  honor.  She  includes  all  the  Seven  Deadly 
Sins,  as  Highmindedness  includes  all  the  virtues.  Duessa  also  serves 
to  represent  Conceit,®  though  her  main  business  is  to  represent  False- 
hood; she  is  very  proud  of  her  beauty  and  finery,  but  when  stripped 

»  For  the  importance  which  Spenser  attaches  to  this  battle  against  joylessness,  see 
the  author's  comments  in  canto  v.  stanza  1. 

2  1,  ix,  16.  17.  sl.vi,  29.  <I,  X,  59.  6 1,  iv,  Arg. 

6  Note  in  I,  iv,  37,  that  Duessa  rides  next  to  Lucifera. 


26  ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  SPENSER 

of  false  show,  she  proves  to  be  only  a  filthy  old  hag.  Clearly  Spenser's 
emphasis  is  on  the  extreme  of  Conceit  or  False  Pride. 

Finally,  Spenser  certainly  makes  Reason  the  determiner  of  the 
\.  mean  for  the  virtue  of  Holiness.     In  canto  ii  the  arch-deceiver 

Archimago  makes  the  Knight  of  Holiness  believe  that  his  lady,  Una, 
has  stained  her  honor.  Enraged,  the  Knight  deserts  Una,  for  whom 
he  has  undertaken  to  slay  the  Dragon  of  Evil,  and  rides  off  alone. 
He  has  ceased  to  be  governed  by  Reason.     We  are  told : 

The  eye  of  [his]  reason  was  with  rage  yblent.^ 

Later  we  see  again  that  he  is  guided  not  by  Reason,  but  by  'will': 

Will  was  his  guide,  and  griefe  led  him  astray.'' 

This  is  the  beginning  of  all  his  troubles.  He  now  misses  the  mean  of 
Highmindedness.  After  a  narrow  escape  from  the  House  of  Pride 
with  its  vices  and  pitiable  victims,  he  is  captured  by  Orgoglio  (FaV 
Pride,  Conceit)  and  languishes  in  his  prison  until  rescued  by  Arthur 
(Highmindedness).  Again,  in  canto  vii,  Arthur  meets  the  deserted 
Una.  In  persuading  her  to  unfold  her  grief,  he  advises  her  that 
"flesh  may  empaire  ....  but  reason  can  repaire."^  And  "  his  goodly 
V  reason"*  wins.  Thus  we  see  that  both  Una  and  the  Knight  of  Holi- 
ness must  be  governed  by  Reason.  But  so  must  Arthur.  In  canto 
ix,  in  which  Arthur  tells  of  the  vision  which  caused  him  to  fall  in  love 
with  Gloriana,  and  of  his  pursuit  of  Glory,  Arthur  says: 

But  me  had  warnd  old  Timons  wise  behest, 
^\  *»^^    yj  \J  Those  creeping  flames  by  reason  to  subdew,  etc.^ 

,  "^■^   -X,'*^''  Here  again  Reason  is  the  determiner  of  the  mean  in  regard  to  High- 

■.^^    ,  >^  mindedness,  or  love  of  honor.     Finally,  even  the  Paynim  Sansfoy 

»^t'''^\^\^*!* . ^^    apologizes  for  forgetting  "the  raines  to  hold  of  reasons  rule."^ 
j^«*^    {^    cjf-         We  come  now  to  Temperance.     Everyone  knows  that  Spenser 

^'^  %^»^'  develops  this  virtue  and  the  virtues  of  all  his  other  Books  by  showing 
V*      ^^^       ^^^^^  opposites  and  by  presenting  various  phases  of  the  virtue  and 

^t  ^  <9>*^'  .^of  its  opposites,  and  that  he  tends  to  make  any  given  virtue  all- 
'^  ^  <>^  0  M^  -^inclusive.  From  the  book  of  any  one  of  Spenser's  virtues  a  good  case 
^^    ^i^'Sft.'^      could  be  made  out  for  all  the  moral  virtues.     But  Spenser  not  only 

V  1  Stanza  5.   ^  Stanza  12.   '  Stanza  41.   « Stanza  42.   » Stanza  9.   • I. iv,  41 . 


¥^ 


ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  THE  "FAERIE  QUEENS"    27 

presents  various  phases  of  Temperance;  he  treats  the  same  phases  of 
Temperance  that  Aristotle  treats.  For  example,  outside  of  Temper- 
ance and  Incontinence  in  the  strict  sense,  the  kinds  of  intemperance 
most  emphasized  by  Aristotle  are  incontinence  in  regard  to  angry 
passion,  incontinence  in  regard  to  honor,  and  incontinence  in  regard 
to  wealth  or  gain.  Aristotle  specially  and  repeatedly  mentions 
these  as  things  in  regard  to  which  men  may  be  incontinent  in  the 
broad  sense.  For  instance,  he  says:  "Men  are  called  incontinent 
in  respect  of  angry  passion,  honor,  and  gain."^  Now  these  are  the 
very  kinds  of  intemperance  which,  outside  of  intemperance  in  the 
strict  sense,  Spenser  presents  most  strongly.  Angry  passion  Spenser 
exemplifies  in  Furor;  in  Phedon,  who,  "chawing  vengeance,"^  mur- 
ders his  sweetheart  and  his  bosom  friend,  and  is  trying  to  murder  his 
sweetheart's  maid  when  he  falls  into  the  hands  of  Furor;  and  in 
Pyrochles,  who  "Furors  chayne  unbinds."^  Incontinence  in  respect 
'"  of  honor  Spenser  exemplifies  in  "Vaine  Braggadocchio."*  He  is  one 
of  Aristotle's  "Conceited  people,"  who,  says  Aristotle,  "are  foolish 
and  ignorant  of  themselves  and  make  themselves  conspicuous  by 

being  so They  get  themselves  up  in  fine  dresses,  and  pose 

for  effect,  and  so  on,  and  wish  their  good  fortune  to  be  known  to  all 
the  world,  and  talk  about  themselves  as  if  that  were  the  road  to 
honor. "^  Braggadocchio  represents  Conceit,  or  desire  of  honor  by 
one  who  is  unworthy  of  it,  one  of  the  opposites  of  Highmindedness, 
or  right  love  of  honor  on  a  great  scale.  Again,  one  of  the  greatest  of 
the  temptations  in  Spenser's  Cave  of  Mammon  is  Ambition,  one  of 
Aristotle's  extremes  in  regard  to  ordinary  honors.  Incontinence  in 
regard  to  wealth  or  gain  is,  of  course,  powerfully  presented  in  Mam- 
mon, who  tempts  the  Knight  of  Temperance  in  canto  vii. 

But,  in  addition  to  treating  it  as  a  kind  of  center  surrounded  by 
opposites,  Spenser  treats  Temperance  as  a  mean  between  extremes, 
emphasizes  one  extreme  in  particular,  and  makes  Reason  the  deter- 
miner of  the  mean.  In  the  first  canto  of  his  Book  on  Temperance 
he  works  out  Aristotle's  mean  concerning  Temperance.  Although 
Aristotle  holds  that  all  the  virtues  are  concerned  with  pleasure  and 
pain,  he  gives  pecuHar  emphasis  to  the  relation  of  Temperance  to 

1 

^  N.  Eth.,Yll.u.       2  11,  iv,  29.       3 II,  v,  Arg.       <  II.  iii,  Arg.       ^  N.  Eth..  IV,  ix. 


28  ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  SPENSER 

pleasure  and  pain  in  his  definition  of  the  virtue.  He  says:  "In 
respect  of  pleasures  and  pains,  although  not  indeed  of  all  pleasures 
and  pains,  and  to  a  less  extent  in  respect  of  pains  than  of  pleasures, 
the  mean  state  is  Temperance."^  Again,  in  connection  with  Incon- 
tinence, Aristotle  gives  an  important  place  to  the  vice  of  Effeminacy. 
He  says: 

Of  the  characters  which  have  been  described  the  one  [ineorj^itence]  is 
rather  a  kind  of  eflfeminacy;  the  other  is  limitiousness.  The  opposite  of 
the  incontinent  character  is  the  continent,^nd  of  the  effeminate  the  stead- 
fast; for  steadfastness  consists  in  holding  out  against  paiivand  continence 
in  overcoming  pleasure,  and  it  is  one  thing  to  hold  out,  and  another  to  over- 
come, as  it  is  one  thing  to  escape  being  beaten  and  another  to  win  a  victory, 
....  If  a  person  gives  way  where  people  generally  resist  and  are  capable 
of  resisting,  he  deserves  to  be  called  eifeminate It  is  only  unpardon- 
able where  a  person  is  mastered  by  things  against  which  most  people  succeed 
in  holding  out,  and  is  impotent  to  struggle  against  them,  unless  his  impotence 
be  due  to  hereditary  constitution  or  to  disease,  as  effeminacy  is  hereditary 
in  the  kings  of  Scythia,  or  as  woman  is  naturally  weaker  than  a  man. 

And  he  continues:  "It  is  people  of  a  quick  and  atrabilious  temper 
whose  incontinence  is  particularly  apt  to  take  the  form  of  impetu- 
osity; for  the  rapidity  or  the  violence  of  their  feeling  prevents  them 
from  waiting  for  the  guidance  of  reason. "^  Finally,  Aristotle  con- 
demns suicide  as  Effeminacy:  "For  it  is  effeminacy  to  fly  from 
troubles,  nor  does  the  suicide  face  death  because  it  is  noble,  but 
because  it  is  a  refuge  from  evil."^  In  canto  i  of  Spenser's  Book 
on  Temperance  we  have  the  story  of  Mordant  and  Amavia.  Acrasia 
(Intemperance),  a  beautiful  but  wicked  enchantress,  entices  Sir 
Mordant  away  from  his  wife  and  finally  poisons  him;  and  the  wife, 
in  a  fit  of  grief,  commits  suicide.  Sir  Guyon  (the  Knight  of  Tem- 
perance) and  his  Palmer  (Reason  or  Prudence),  having  learned  the 
story  from  the  expiring  wife,  stand  looking  at  the  two  dead  bodies. 
Sir  Guyon,  turning  to  his  Palmer,  says: 

Old  Syre 
Behold  the  image  of  mortalitie. 
And  feeble  nature  cloth'd  with  fleshly  tjre. 
When  raging  passion  with  fierce  tyrannic, 
X  Robs  reason  of  her  due  regalitie, 

>  N.  Elh.,  II.  vii.  2  Ibid.,  VII,  viii.  '  Ibid.,  III.  xi. 


ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  THE  "FAERIE  QUEENE"    29 

And  makes  it  servant  to  her  basest  part: 
The  strong  it  weakens  with  infirmitie, 
And  with  bold  furic  armes  the  weakest  hart; 
The  strong  through  pleasure  soonest  falles,  the 
weake  through  smart. 

Then  Sir  Guyon's  Palmer  (Reason)  replies : 

But  temperance  (said  he)  with  golden  squire 
Betivixt  them  both  can  measure  out  a  meane, 
Neither  to  melt  in  pleasures  whot  desire, 
Nor  fry  in  hartlesse  griefe  and  doleful!  teene. 
Thrise  happie  man,  who  fares  them  both  atweene} 

Thus  the  incontinent  Sir  Mordant  and  the  effeminate  Amavia  meet 
disaster  because  they  fail  to  take  the  mean  which  Reason  dictates  in 
regard  to  "pleasure"  and  "smart."  It  will  be  noted  that  Spenser 
follows  Aristotle  even  in  such  details  as  showing  that  greater  strength 
is  required  to  overcome  pleasure  than  to  resist  pain.  The  importance 
which  Spenser  attaches  to  the  suicide  described  in  the  episode  is 
indicated  by  the  name  Amavia  (Love  of  Life).  Love  of  Life  effemi- 
nately gives  way  to  pain.  The  lesson  of  this  canto  cannot  possibly 
be  called  "only  incidental";  for  Sir  Guyon's  relation  to  Mordant  and 
Amavia  is  one  of  the  larger  elements  of  the  plot,  and  one  of  the  few 
discussed  in  Spenser's  letter  to  Raleigh.  It  is  the  fate  of  Mordant 
and  Amavia  at  the  hands  of  Acrasia  (Intemperance)  which  causes 
Guyon,  the  Knight  of  Temperance,  to  enter  upon  his  quest  to  bind 
Acrasia, 

So  much  for  canto  i.  In  canto  ii  Spenser  works  out  the  mean  in 
regard  to  Aristotelian  Temperance  in  the  strict,  or  particular,  sense.^ 
Here,  to  quote  Spenser's  argument  to  the  canto.  Sir  Guyon  is  shown 

the  face  of  golden  Meane. 
Her  sisters  two  Extremities 
strive  her  to  banish  cleane. 

Reason  is  made  the  determiner  of  the  mean.^ 

What  we  have  said  of  Spenser's  treatment  of  Temperance  as  a 
mean  between  extremes  is  hardly  more  than  a  beginning  of  what 

1 II.  i,  57-58. 

*  With  the  episode  of  Guyon's  visit  to  Medina  cf.  N.  Eth.,  II,  vii;  III,  .xiii;  and  VII,  xi. 

'  See  especially  II,  ii,  38.     See  also  stanzas  15  and  17. 


x: 


30 


ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  SPENSER 


.V^ 


V 


>Nt 


6'" 


could  be  said  if  space  permitted.  See,  for  example,  canto  xii,  which 
is  a  series  of  studies  of  the  mean.  The  truth  is  that  the  whole  Book 
is  a  study  of  the  mean.  Like  Aristotle,  Spenser  puts  the  emphasis 
on  the  extreme  of  excess,  not  on  that  of  deficiency.  Again,  we  have 
mentioned  only  a  few  of  the  numerous  instances  in  which  Spenser 
makes  Reason  the  determiner  of  the  mean.  See,  for  example,  the 
author's  comments  in  stanzas  1-2  of  canto  xi,  in  which  Spenser  lays 
down  the  general  principle  that  Reason  is  the  determiner  of  the  mean 
in  regard  to  Temperance.  Another  point  is  worth  noting.  Although 
Aristotle  makes  Reason  the  determiner  of  the  mean  in  the  case  of 
each  of  the  moral  virtues,  he  gives  peculiar  emphasis  to  the  rule  of 
Reason  in  regard  to  Temperance.  Accordingly,  Spenser  gives  the 
greatest  possible  emphasis  to  the  rule  of  reason  in  respect  of  Tem- 
^^j  perance.  For  example,  Aristotle  says  in  his  discussion  of  Temper- 
ance: "As  a  child  ought  to  live  according  to  the  direction  of  his  tutor 
(iraLdayciiyos)  so  ought  the  concupiscent  element  in  man  to  live 
according  to  the  reason."^  '  And  Spenser  gives  his  Knight  of  Temper- 
ance a  tutor,  the  black  Palmer,  who  continually  accompanies, 
instructs,  and  directs  him,  and  whom  his  "pupill''^  (Guyon)  faithfully 
obeys.  It  is  hardly  necessary  to  add  that  Guyon's  Palmer  is  Reason. 
If  other  proof  than  the  allegory  be  needed  that  he  is  so,  it  may  be 
i^     found,  for  example,  in  II,  i,  34;  or  in  II,  iv,  2;  or  in  II,  xii,  38. 

Passing  to  Chastity,  Book  III,  we  find  that  Spenser  again  follows 
Aristotle's  method  of  treating  a  virtue  and  his  conception  of  what  a 
virtue  is.  Even  Chastity  is  presented  as  a  mean  between  extremes. 
Moreover,  the  extremes  themselves  are  Aristotelian. 

There  is  a  very  close  relation  between  Shame,  or  Chastity,  and 
Temperance.  Both  Aristotle  and  Spenser  make  Temperance  "include 
sex  morality.  The  extremes  of  Aristotelian  Shame,  or  Modesty,  in 
the  strict  sense,  are  Shamelessness  and  Licentiousness,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  Bashfulness,  lack  of  courteous  bearing,  on  the  other.^ 
The  extremes  of  Aristotelian  Temperance,  in  the  strict  sense,  are 
Licentiousness  and  Incontinence,  on  the  one  hand,  and  Insensibihty, 
or  Asceticism,  on  the  other.^    Now  it  will  be  remembered  that 

1  N.Eth.,lll,xv. 

»II,  vui.  7. 

»  N.  Eth.,  II,  vii,  and  IV,  xv;    Rhetoric,  II,  vi,  and  II,  xii-xiii. 

*  N.  Eth.,  II,  vii;  III,  xiii-xv;  VII,  especially  chap.  xi. 


ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  THE  "FAERIE  QUEENE"    31 

Spenser  in  his  discussion  of  Chastity  draws  not  only  upon  Aristotle's 
discussion  of  Shame,  or  Modesty,  but  also  upon  that  part  of  his  dis- 
cussion of  Temperance  which  has  to  do  with  sex  morality.  Accord- 
ingly he  makes  the  extremes  of  his  virtue  of  Chastity  the  Aristotelian 
extremes  of  Shamelessness,  Licentiousness,  and  Incontinence,  on  the 
one  hand,  and  Discourtesy  and  Insensibility,  or  Asceticism,  or 
Celibacy,  on  the  other. 

In  the  proem  to  the  Book  on  Chastity,  Spenser  tells  us  that  just 
as  Gloriana  represents  the  rule  of  Elizabeth,  so  Belphoebe  represents 
"her  rare  chastity,"  and  he  makes  the  same  point  in  his  letter  to 
Raleigh.  In  telling  how  Belphoebe  cared  for  her  "flower"  of 
"chastity  and  virtue  virginal,"  he  indicates  the  extremes: 

That  dainty  Rose,  the  daughter  of  her  Morne, 
More  deare  then  life  she  tendered,  whose  flowre 
The  girlond  of  her  honour  did  adorne : 
Ne  suffred  she  the  Midday es  scorching  poiore, 
Ne  the  sharp  Northerne  wind  thereon  to  showre, 
But  lapped  up  her  silken  leaves  most  chaire, 
WTien  so  the  fro  ward  skye  began  to  lowre : 
But  soone  as  calmed  was  the  Christall  aire, 
She  did  it  faire  dispred,  and  let  to  florish  faire.* 

For  the  Courtesy  of  Belphoebe  see,  in  III,  v,  27-55,^  the  story 
of  her  nursing  the  wounded  Timias  and  of  her  treatment  of  him,  a 
social  inferior,  when  he  falls  in  love  with  her.  Belphoebe  is  praised 
because  she  can  be  chaste  without  running  into  the  extreme  of 
Discourtesy : 

In  so  great  prayse  of  stedfast  chastity, 

Nathlesse  she  was  so  curteous  and  kind, 

Tempred  with  grace  and  goodly  modesty, 

That  seemed  those  two  vertues  strove  to  find 

The  higher  place  in  her  Heroick  mind. 

To  realize  the  seriousness  of  this  extreme  of  Discourtesy  it  is 
only  necessary  to  note  the  contemptible  character  of  the  discourteous 
Mirabella  in  Spenser's  Book  on  Courtesy.  Discourtesy  here  clearly 
includes  the  idea  of  celibacy.  It  should  be  remembered  that  Spenser's 
Courtesy  is  Aristotle's  Friendliness — readiness  to  act  as  a  true  friend 

1  III,  V,  51.     See  also  stanzas  50-55,  especially  52. 

2  Note  especially  III,  v,  54-55.     See  also  III,  vi,  1-3. 


32  ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  SPENSER 

would  act — and  that,  with  both  Aristotle  and  Spenser,  Friendship 
includes  love.  In  his  argument  to  canto  vii  of  Book  VI  Spenser 
tells  us  that  we  are  to  learn  of  "Fayre  Mirabellaes  punishment  for 
loves  disdaine  decreed."  MirabeUa  is  cruel  to  her  lovers  and  even 
boasts  of  the  fact  that  they  suffer  and  die  because  of  their  love  for 
her.  "She  did  all  love  despize,"  She  is  determined  to  live  a  life 
of  celibacy. 

She  was  borne  free,  not  bound  to  any  wight, 

And  so  would  ever  live,  and  love  her  owne  delight.* 

Such  is  the  Discourtesy,  or  Unfriendliness,  which  is  one  of  the 
extremes  in  regard  to  Chasity.  Mirabella  is  finally  brought  to  justice 
by  Cupid. 

Another  passage  in  which  Spenser  represents  Discourtesy  and 
Cehbacy  as  an  extreme  in  regard  to  Chastity  is  in  canto  vi  of  the 
Book  on  Chastity.  Venus  has  lost  her  little  son,  Cupid.  In  search- 
ing a  wood  for  him,  she  comes  upon  her  sister,  Diana,  of  whom  she 
makes  inquiries.     Diana  is  ungracious,  intolerant: 

Thereat  Diana  gan  to  smile,  in  scorne 

Of  her  vaine  plaint,  and  to  her  scoffing  sayd; 
"Great  pittie  sure,  that  ye  be  so  forlorne 

Of  your  gay  sonne,  that  gives  you  so  good  ayd 

To  your  disports:  ill  mote  ye  bene  apayd." 

But  she  was  more  engrieved,  and  replide; 
"Faire  sister,  ill  beseemes  it  to  upbrayd 

A  dolefull  heart  with  so  disdainfull  pride; 

The  like  that  mine,  may  be  your  paine  another  tide. 


And  ill  becomes  you  with  your  loftie  creasts. 

To  scorne  the  joy,  that  Jove  is  glad  to  seek; 

We  both  are  bound  to  follow  heavens  beheasts, 

And  tend  our  charges  with  obeisance  meeke. 

Spare,  gentle  sister,  with  reproch  my  paine  to  eeke."^ 

After  Diana  has  made  further  insulting  speeches,  she  is  finally 
induced  to  join  in  the  search  for  Cupid.  While  searching,  Diana 
and  Venus  find  Belphoebe  and  Amoretta,  two  babes  born  at  a  birth, 
Belphoebe  being  born  first,  and  then  Amoretta,  to  show  that  first 
comes  maidenly  chastity,  "perfect  Maydenhed,"  and  then  love  and 

«  VI,  vu.  30-31.  2  III.  vi,  21-22. 


ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  THE  "FAERIE  QUEENE"    33 

"goodly  womanhed."     Diana  and  Venus  decide  each  to  adopt  one 

of  the  babes. 

Dame  Phoebe  [Diana]  to  a  Nymph  her  babe  betooke, 
To  be  upbrought  in  perfect  Maydenhed, 
And  to  her  selfe  her  name  Belphoebe  red : 
But  Venus  hers  thence  farre  away  convayed, 
To  be  upbrought  in  goodly  womanhed.^ 

Venus  takes  Amoretta  to  be  brought  up  in  the  Garden  of  Adonis, 

where,  we  are  told, 

All  things,  as  they  created  were,  doe  grow, 
And  yet  remember  well  the  mightie  word, 
Which  first  was  spoken  by  th'  Almightie  lord, 
That  bad  them  to  increase  and  multiply.^ 

Perhaps  Spenser's  plainest  condemnation  of  Celibacy  and  Insensi- 
bility, or  Asceticism,  is  the  episode  dealing  with  Marinell  in  the 
Book  on  Chastity.  Marinell  is  "a  mighty  man  at  arms."  He 
eschews  the  love  of  women,  for  Proteus,  the  sea-god  and  prophet, 
has  taught  his  mother  to  keep  him  from  all  womankind : 

For  thy  she  gave  him  warning  every  day, 
The  love  of  women  not  to  entertaine; 
A  lesson  too  too  hard  for  living  clay, 
From  love  in  course  of  Nature  to  refraine : 
Yet  he  his  mothers  lore  did  well  retaine, 
And  ever  from  faire  Ladies  love  did  fly; 
Yet  many  Ladies  fair  did  oft  complaine. 
That  they  for  love  of  him  would  algates  dy: 
Dy,  who  so  hst  for  him,  he  was  loves  enimy.' 

One  of  the  first  great  victories  of  Britomart  (Chastity)  is  her  defeat 

of  this  sturdy  champion. 

Though  Britomart  leaves  Marinell  for  dead,  his  mother,  Cymoent, 

by  her  magic  finally  revives  him.     We  now  learn  that  fair  Florimell 

loves  Marinell,  but  is  scorned  by  him.     In  canto  xi  of  Book  IV 

Spenser  gives  a  synopsis  of  the  story  of  Marinell  and  Florimell,  in 

order  to  continue  it.     The  lovely  Florimell,  because  she  will  not 

grant  her  love  to  the  sea-god  Proteus,  is  suffering  horrible  torments  at 

Proteus'  hands. 

And  all  this  was  for  love  of  Marinell, 
Who  her  despysed  (ah  who  would  her  despyse  ?) 
And  wemens  love  did  from  his  hart  expell. 
And  all  those  joyes  that  weak  mankind  entyse.* 

» III,  vi.  28.  2  III,  vi,  34.  a  III,  iv.  25-26.  « IV,  xi,  5. 


34  ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  SPENSER 

Clearly  this  is  Celibacy  and  Insensibility,  or  Asceticism.  Marinell 
is  finally  reformed  by  the  love  of  Florimell. 

One  more  episode  might  be  given  here.  It  is  in  the  opening  canto 
of  the  Book  on  Chastity.  Britomart,  who  fights  for  Chastity,  and 
the  Red  Cross  Knight  (Holiness),  who  "gave  her  good  aid,"  come  in 
their  journey  to  "Castle  Joyous,"  presided  over  by  the  witch  Male- 
casta,  called  "the  Lady  of  Dehght."  In  the  "sumptuous  guize" 
of  Castle  Joyous  the  knights  see 

The  image  of  superfluous  riotize, 
Exceeding  much  the  state  of  meane  degree.* 

Smith  and  Selincourt  define  the  term  "meane,"  in  this  passage,  as 
"middling";  and  indeed  the  context  seems  to  make  any  other 
interpretation  impossible. 

Proof  that  the  contemptible  Mirabella  of  the  Book  on  Courtesy 
is  Discourtesy  (if  that  can  need  special  proof),  and  that  Marinell  of 
the  Book  on  Chastity  also  illustrates  Discourtesy — both  being  guilty 
of  the  serious  offense  of  Cruelty,  Unfriendliness,  toward  their  lovers — 
may  be  had  by  comparing  their  conduct  with  the  Courtesy  of  Brito- 
mart (Chastity)  toward  even  the  amorous  "Lady  of  Delight,"  who, 
deceived  by  Britomart's  armor,  woos  the  Knight  of  Chastity  in  no 
modest  manner.  Britomart  considers  the  feelings  of  other  people 
and  therefore  does  not  rebuff  the  Lady  of  Dehght  until  her  conduct 
becomes  outrageous: 

For  thy  she  would  not  in  discourteise  wise, 
Scorne  the  faire  offer  of  good  will  prof  est; 
For  great  rebuke  it  is,  love  to  despise. 
Or  rudely  sdiegne  a  gentle  harts  request.^ 

Finally,  a  consideration  of  the  characters  in  Book  III  shows 
plainly  that  Spenser  treats  Chastity  as  a  mean,  and  that  his  extremes 
are  the  AristoteHan  ones  already  mentioned.  Marinell  and  Diana 
go  to  extremes  in  the  direction  of  Discourtesy  and  Celibacy.  Brito- 
mart, Belphoebe,  Amoretta,  and  the  true  Florimell  represent  the 
mean.  The  extreme  of  Licentiousness  is  emphatically  represented 
in  the  horrible  Titan  twins,  Argante  and  Ollyphant,  the  hyena-Hke 
Brute,  Proteus,  Malecasta,  the  false  Florimell,  the  infamous  Helle- 
nore,  and  Busyrane. 

» III.  i.  33.  2  III.  i.  55. 


ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  THE  "FAERIE  QUEENE"    35 

In  addition  to  treating  Chastity  as  a  mean,  Spenser  not  only  dis- 
cusses various  phases  of  the  virtue,  after  the  manner  of  Aristotle, 
but  draws  from  Aristotle  the  virtues  and  vices  which  he  discusses  in 
connection  with  Chastity.  This  fact  throws  light  on  an  otherwise 
difficult  passage  in  the  Faerie  Queene.  In  his  continued  discussion  of 
Temperance,^  already  referred  to,  Aristotle  has  a  curious  discussion 
of  brutality,  or  unnatural  vice.  "There  is  more  excuse,"  he  says, 
"for  following  natural  impulses,  as  indeed  there  is  for  following  all 
such  desires  as  are  common  to  all  the  world,  and  the  more  common 
they  are,  the  more  excusable  they  are  also."^  Again  he  says,  "And 
if  these  are  brutal  states,  there  are  others  which  are  produced  in  some 

people  by  disease  and  madness Other  such  states  again  are 

the  result  of  a'  morbid  disposition  or  of  habit."  In  this  brutal  or 
unnatural  conduct  he  includes  "unnatural  vice,"  which  he  elsewhere 
refers  to  as  "unnatural  passion."^  Compare  this  with  Book  III, 
canto  ii,  of  the  Faerie  Queene.  Britomart,  who  represents  Elizabeth 
as  well  as  Chastity,  is  madly  in  love  with  Artegall  (Justice).  In  the 
midst  of  this  fine  compliment  to  the  Queen  we  have  the  following 
curious  passage  put  in  the  mouth  of  Glauce,  Britomart's  old  nurse, 
after  Britomart  has  confessed  her  love : 

Daughter  (said  she)  what  need  ye  be  dismayd, 
-^     Or  why  make  ye  such  Monster  of  your  mind  ? 

Of  much  more  uncouth  thing  I  was  affrayd; 
^    Of  filthy  lust,  contrarie  unto  kind: 

But  this  affection  nothing  straunge  I  find; 

For  who  with  reason  can  you  aye  reprove, 

To  love  the  semblant  pleasing  most  your  mind, 

And  yield  your  heart,  whence  ye  cannot  remove  ? 

No  guilt  in  you,  but  in  the  tyranny  of  love. 

Not  so  th'  Arabian  Myrrhe  did  set  her  mind; 

Nor  so  did  Biblis  spend  her  pining  hart, 

But  lov'd  their  native  flesh  against  all  kind, 

And  to  their  purpose  used  wicked  art: 

Yet  played  Pasiphae  a  more  monstrous  part, 

That  lov'd  a  bull,  and  learned  a  beast  to  bee; 

Such  shamefull  lusts  who  loaths  not,  which  depart 

From  com-se  of  nature  and  of  modestie  ? 

Sweet  love  such  lewdness  bands  from  his  faire  companie.* 

>iV.  Eth.,  VII,  i  and  vi-vii.        2  Ibid..  VII,  vii.        3  ibid.,  VII,  vi.        *  III,  ii,  40-41. 


36  ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  SPENSER 

I  cannot  resist  giving  another  example  of  Spenser's  conformity 
to  Aristotle's  scheme.  In  cantos  ix  and  x  of  Spenser's  Book  on 
Chastity  we  have  the  story  of  Hellenore  and  Malbecco.  The  latter, 
at  first  a  real  character,  in  canto  x  becomes  Jealousy  in  one  of  the 
most  powerful  of  all  Spenser's  personifications.  It  is  the  unlikeness 
of  Malbecco  and  Hellenore  which  causes  their  great  unhappiness. 
This  unlikeness  includes  the  fact  that  Malbecco  has  reached  the  age 
of  impotence,  while  his  wife  is  young.  Their  unhappiness  results 
in  the  "rape"  of  Hellenore  (Helen)  by  Paridell  (Paris).  That  their 
unhappiness  is  brought  about  by  their  inequality  and  unlikeness  is 
clear  from  reading  the  cantos.  I  quote  a  few  passages,  however, 
which  establish  this  point  by  literal  exposition : 

But  all  his  mind  is  set  on  mucky  pelfe. 
Yet  is  he  lincked  to  a  lovely  lasse. 


The  which  to  him  both  far  unequall  yeares, 

And  also  far  unlike  conditions  has; 

For  she  does  joy  to  play  emongst  her  peares, 

And  to  be  free  from  hard  restraint  and  gealous  feares. 

But  he  is  old,  and  withered  like  hay. 

Unfit  faire  Ladies  service  to  supply. 

The  privie  guilt  whereof  makes  him  alway 

Suspect  her  truth,  and  keepe  continuall  spy 

Upon  her  with  his  other  blincked  eye; 

Ne  suffreth  he  resort  of  living  wight 

Approch  to  her,  ne  keepe  her  company, 

But  in  close  bowre  her  mewes  from  all  mens  sight, 

Depriv'd  of  kindly  joy  and  naturall  deUght. 

Malbecco  he,  and  Hellenore  she  hight, 
Unfitly  yokt  together  in  one  teeme. 

Fast  good  will  with  gentle  courtesyes, 

And  timely  service  to  her  pleasures  meet 

May  her  perhaps  containe,  that  else  would  algates  fleet.' 

Now  there  is  a  very  close  relation  between  the  virtues  of  Chastity 
and  Friendship,  for  Aristotle  makes  Friendship  include  love  and  the 
relation  of  husband  and  wife.^    Again,  Aristotle  repeatedly  makes 

'  III.  ix.  4-7. 

» That  Aristotelian  Friendsiiip  includes  love  is  clear  from  the  whole  of  Book  VIII 
of  N.  Eth.     The  Friendship  of  husband  and  wife  is  discussed  specifically  in  chap.  xii. 


ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  THE  "FAERIE  QUEENE"    37 

the  point  that  perfect  Friendship  requires  perfect  equality  and  Uke- 
ness,  and  that  any  Friendship  requires  approximate  equality  and 
likeness.  For  example,  he  says:  "In  Friendship  quantitative 
equality  is  first  and  proportionate  second.  This  is  clearly  seen  to  be 
the  case  if  there  be  a  wide  distinction  between  two  persons  in  respect 
of  virtue,  vice,  affluence,  or  anything  else.  For  persons  so  widely 
different  cease  to  be  friends;  they  do  not  even  affect  to  be  friends."^ 
Thus  the  lesson  that  the  inequality  and  unlikeness  of  Malbecco  and 
Hellenore  is  the  cause  of  their  destruction  is  straight  Aristotelian 
doctrine.  But  this  is  not  all.  In  the  Politics,  which  is  a  continua- 
tion of  the  Nicomachean  Ethics,'^  Aristotle  discusses  the  subject  of 
marriage.     At  the  beginning  of  chapter  xvi  of  Book  VI  he  says: 

In  legislating  about  this  association  [marriage]  he  [the  legislator]  should 
have  in  view,  not  only  the  persons  themselves  who  are  to  marry,  but  their 
time  of  life,  so  that  they  may  arrive  simultaneously  at  corresponding  periods 
in  respect  of  age,  and  there  may  not  be  a  discrepancy  between  their  powers, 
whether  it  is  that  the  husband  is  still  able  to  beget  children  and  the  wife 
is  not,  or  vice  versa,  as  this  is  a  state  of  things  which  is  a  source  of  mutual 
bickerings  and  dissentions. 

And  Aristotle  reiterates  the  idea  throughout  the  chapter.  That  this 
point  is  the  part  of  the  lesson  to  which  Spenser  gives  emphasis  is 
clear,  not  only  from  the  story  and  the  literal  exposition,  but  also 
from  the  name  IVIalbecco.^  But  even  the  idea  of  the  impotent  old 
husband's  love  of  money  and  disregard  of  honor  is  Aristotelian. 
In  the  Nicomachean  Ethics,  IV,  iii,  Aristotle  says:  "Illiberahty  is 
incurable;  for  it  seems  that  old  age  or  impotence  of  any  kind  makes 
men  illiberal,"  and  he  repeats  this  thought  in  the  Rhetoric* 

Again,  Spenser  makes  it  indisputably  clear  that  reason  is  the  Ir 

determiner  of  the  right  course  in  respect  of  Chastity.  Thus,  as  we 
have  already  seen,  the  old  nurse  Glauce,  who  in  a  measure  represents 
Reason,  or  Prudence,  assures  Britomart  (Chastity)  that  her  conduct 

«  N.  Eth.,  VIII,  ix. 

2  Not  only  the  last  chapter  of  the  N.  Eth.  but  the  whole  book  prepares  the  way  for 
the  Politics.     It  is  upon  the  relation  between  Morality  and  Reason,  or  Prudence,  explained 

n  the  N.  Eth.,  that  the  legislator  of  the  Politics  bases  his  laws. 

3  Ital.  becco,  a  buck,  a  goat,  a  cuckold;  cf.  Marston,  Malcontent,  I,  i,  118-20: 
M.    Dvike,  thou  art  a  becco,  a  comuto. 

P.     How  ? 

M.    Thou  art  a  cuckold. 

*  II,  xiii. 


38  ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  SPENSER 

is  right,  for  it  is  in  accordance  with  Reason.^     On  the  other  hand, 
we  are  told  concerning  the  unholy  passion  of  the  witch's  son : 
So  strong  is  passion  that  no  reason  hears.'^ 

In  discussing  the  virtue  of  Friendship,  Spenser  does  not  make 
much  of  the  mean.  But  neither  does  his  master.  Aristotle  only 
suggests  that  perhaps  we  ought  to  observe  the  mean  in  regard  to  the 
number  of  friendships  which  we  undertake  to  maintain.  Like 
Aristotle,  however,  Spenser  does  develop  the  virtue  of  Friendship  by 
showing  its  opposites  and  by  presenting  various  phases  of  the  virtue 
and  of  its  opposites.  Thus  he  discusses  Discord  as  well  as  Concord, 
Hate  as  well  as  Love,^  Falseness  (Duessa)  as  well  as  "Friendship 
trew."  He  shows  not  only  the  friendship  of  the  virtuous,  as  seen  in 
such  cases  as  that  of  Cambel  and  Triamond,  but  also  the  friendship 
of  the  vicious,  friendship  for  gain,  and  so  on,  in  such  cases  as  the 
friendship  of  Blandamour  and  Paridell,  which,  in  accordance  with 
Aristotle's  teaching,  soon  ends  in  strife.*  Professor  Erskine^  asserts 
that  Spenser's  Book  on  Friendship  ''seems  at  first  sight  to  treat  only 
of  jealousies  and  quarrels."  He  brings  forward  two  sentences  of 
Cicero  from  which  he  thinks  Spenser  must  have  learned  that  it  was 
possible  to  present  Friendship  by  showing  its  opposite.  The  fact 
is  that  in  presenting  Friendship  by  showing  its  opposite  Spenser  is 
not  only  doing  what  Aristotle  did  in  everyone  of  his  virtues,  but  is 
doing  what  he  himself  did  in  every  book  of  the  Faerie  Queene. 

Moreover,  Spenser  discusses  the  same  opposites  and  phases  of 
Friendship  that  Aristotle  discusses.  For  example,  Aristotle  deals 
with  the  friendship  of  the  virtuous,  which  endures,  and  the  friend- 
ship of  the  vicious,  friendship  for  gain,  and  so  on,  which  does  not 
endure.  We  have  already  seen  that  Spenser  represents  these  phases 
of  Friendship.  Again,  Aristotle's  Friendship  is  of  three  main  kinds: 
the  friendship  of  kinsmen,  the  friendship  of  love,  including  marriage, 
and  friendship  in  the  ordinary  sense.^  In  IV,  ix,  1-3  of  the  Faerie 
Queene,  Spenser  gives  a  plain,  literal  exposition  of  these  three  kinds 

»  III,  ii.  40. 

*III.  vii,  21. 

» IV.  X,  34  and  32. 

*  IV,  ii,  13,  18. 

'  Pub.  Mod.  Lang.  Assoc,  XXIII,  846. 

•  See,  for  example,  N.  Eth.,  VIII,  xii. 


ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  THE  "FAERIE  QUEENE"    39 

of  Friendship,  as  Professor  Erskine  has  observed;^  and  he  reiterates 
this  classification  throughout  the  book.^  Again,  in  connection  with 
love  Spenser  illustrates  the  Aristotelian  extremes  of  insensibility, 
or  celibacy,  unreasonable  love,  inconstancy,  and  licentiousness.' 
Once  more,  in  the  Book  on  Friendship,  as  well  as  in  the  Book  on 
Chastity,  Spenser  follows  Aristotle  in  making  equality  and  likeness 
essential  to  Friendship.  Friendship  is  impossible  between  Cambell 
and  any  one  of  the  three  brothers,  Priamond,  Diamond,  and  Tria- 
mond.^  But  when  Triamond,  by  receiving  the  spirits  of  his  two 
brothers,  becomes  the  equal  of  Cambell,  the  two  become  perfect 
friends.^  Spenser  does  not  stop,  however,  at  showing  friendship 
between  these  equals  of  high  degree;  he  shows  also  friendship  between 
two  equal  and  like  persons  of  low  degree,  the  two  squires  in  cantos 
viii  and  ix.^  Finally,  the  most  striking  thing  about  Aristotle's  dis- 
cussion of  Friendship  is  his  identification  of  this  virtue  with  Concord 
in  the  State.  He  says:  "Again,  it  seems  that  friendship  or  love 
is  the  bond  which  holds  states  together,  and  that  legislators  set 
more  store  by  it  than  by  justice;  for  concord  is  apparently  akin  to 
friendship,  and  it  is  concord  that  they  especially  seek  to  promote, 
and  faction,  as  being  hostility  to  the  state,  that  they  especially  try 
to  expel. "^  Even  this  phase  of  Aristotelian  Friendship  is  emphati- 
cally presented  in  the  Faerie  Queene.  In  the  first  canto  of  his  Book 
on  Friendship  Spenser  presents  Discord,  the  enemy  of  Friendship, 
whom  the  wicked  witch  Duessa  has  brought  from  hell  "to  trouble 
noble  knights." 

Her  name  was  Ate,  mother  of  debate, 
And  all  dissention  which  doth  dayly  grow 
Amongst  fraile  men,  that  many  a  publike  state 
And  many  a  private  oft  doth  overthrow. 


Hard  by  the  gates  of  hell  her  dwelling  is, 
Yet  many  waies  to  enter  may  be  found, 

>  Pub.  Mod.  Lang.  Assoc,  XXIII,  849. 

2 Note,  for  example,  the  "friends,"  "brethren,"  and  "lovers"  of  IV,  i,  24. 

'See  IV,  ix,  21. 

*  IV.  ii-iii. 

'  IV,  iii,  26-37,  especially  37. 

•  See  especially  viii,  55-56,  and  ix,  10-11. 
»  N.  Elh.,  VIII.  1. 


40  ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  SPENSER 

But  none  to  issue  forth  when  one  is  in : 
For  discord  harder  is  to  end  then  to  begin. 

And  all  within  the  riven  walls  were  hung 
With  ragged  monuments  of  times  forepast, 
All  which  the  sad  effects  of  discord  sung. 

Among  these  "monuments"  are  "broken  scepters,"  "great  cities 
ransackt,"  and  "nations  captived  and  huge  armies  slaine."  "There 
was  the  signe  of  antique  Babylon,"  of  Thebes,  of  Rome,  of  Salem, 
and  "sad  Ilion."  There  were  the  names  of  Nimrod  and  "of  Alex- 
ander, and  his  Princes  five  Which  shar'd  to  them  the  spoiles  that  he 
had  got  alive."  And  there  too  were  the  "relicks  ....  of  the 
dreadful!  discord,  which  did  drive  The  noble  Argonauts  to  outrage 
feU." 

For  all  this  worlds  faire  workmanship  she  tride. 
Unto  his  last  confusion  to  bring, 
And  that  great  golden  chaine  quite  to  divide, 
With  which  it  blessed  Concord  hath  together  tide. 

Thus  Spenser  follows  Aristotle  in  making  Friendship  include 
Concord  in  the  State.  The  same  idea  comes  out  in  Spenser's  pres- 
entation of  Concord  in  canto  x: 

Concord  she  cleeped  was  in  common  reed. 
Mother  of  blessed  Peace,  and  Friendship  trew.* 

In  discussing  his  fifth  virtue.  Justice,  Spenser  expresses  the  mean 
in  almost  the  exact  words  of  Aristotle.  Aristotle  tells  us  that  par- 
ticular Justice  has  to  do  with  the  goods  of  fortune.^  He  defines 
Justice  as  follows:  "Just  conduct  is  a  mean  between  committing 
and  suffering  injustice;  for  to  commit  injustice  is  to  have  too  much, 
and  to  suffer  it  is  to  have  too  little."^  In  the  proem  to  Book  V 
Spenser  in  describing  the  Golden  Age,  when  all  men  were  just,  says: 
And  all  men  sought  their  owne,  and  none  no  more. 

Again,  in  Book  V  proper,  Spenser's  treatment  of  Justice  as  a 
mean  is  unmistakable.  In  canto  ii  we  have  the  Gyant  with  his 
"  huge  great  paire  of  ballance."  Complaining  that  this  world's  goods 
are  unjustly,  because  unequally,  distributed,  the  Gyant  proposes 
to  weigh  everything  and  make  a  just  distribution.     He  has  asserted 

iIV,  X.  34.  ^  N.  Eth..Y,u.  ^  n.  Eth.,Y,  ix. 


ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  THE  "FAERIE  QUEEN E"    41 

that  he  "could  justly  weigh  the  wrong  and  right,"  and  Artegall 
(Justice)  is  testing  him.     Artegall  finally  tells  him: 

But  set  the  truth  and  set  the  right  aside, 
For  they  with  wrong  or  falshood  will  not  fare; 
And  put  two  wrongs  together  to  be  tride, 
Or  else  two  falses,  each  of  equall  share; 
And  then  together  doe  them  both  compare. 
For  truth  is  one,  and  right  is  ever  one. 
So  did  he,  and  then  plaine  it  did  appeare, 
Whether  of  them  the  greater  were  attone. 
But  right  sate  in  the  middest  of  the  beame  alone. 

But  he  the  right  from  thence  did  thrust  away, 
For  it  was  not  the  right,  which  he  did  seeke; 
But  rather  strove  extremities  to  way, 
Th'  one  to  diminish  th'  other  for  to  eeke. 
For  of  the  meane  he  greatly  did  misleeke.^ 

At  this  point  Talus,  Artegall's  iron  squire  (the  iron  hand  of  Justice), 
hurls  the  Gyant  into  the  sea  and  drowns  him.  This  mean  which 
the  Gyant  "misleekes,"  and  which  Justice  demands,  is  not  simply 
a  mean,  but  Aristotle's  mean  of  Justice ;  for  it  is  the  mean  in  regard  to 
the  distribution  of  the  goods  of  fortune.  Moreover,  the  episode  is 
Aristotelian  in  every  particular.  Aristotle  teaches  that  equality  as 
applied  to  Justice  must  be  proportionate,  not  absolute.  Justice,  he 
holds,  demands  that  the  goods  of  fortune  be  distributed  propor- 
tionately to  the  varying  degrees  of  virtue  in  the  citizens. ^  He  even 
protests  particularly  against  an  equalization  of  property  and  reiterates 
this  protest.^ 

Spenser's  characters  in  this  Book  represent  not  only  the  mean 
but  also  the  two  Aristotelian  extremes  in  regard  to  Justice:  that  of 
accepting  less  than  rightfully  belongs  to  one,  and  that  of  taking 
more.  The  first  is  represented  by  the  Squire  who  is  wronged  by 
Sir  Sanglier.  Sanglier  will  not  "rest  contented  with  his  right,"* 
but,  "the  fairere  love  to  gaine,"  takes  the  Squire's  Ladie  and  slays 

» V,  ii.  45-49. 

i  N.  Eth.,  Book  V.  Aristotle  makes  the  same  point  in  his  discussion  of  Friendship. 
See  N.  Eth.,  VIII.  ix. 

»  See,  for  example,  Politics,  VIII,  ix. 
«V,  i,  17. 


42  ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  SPENSER 

his  own.  The  Squire  complains  to  Artegall.  Brought  before  Arte- 
gall  for  judgment,  SangUer  defies  his  accuser,  and  testifies  falsely 
that — 

neither  he  did  shed  that  Ladies  bloud 
Nor  tooke  away  his  love,  but  his  owne  proper  good. 

Then 

Well  did  the  Squire  perceive  himself  too  weake, 
To  aunswere  his  defiaunce  in  the  field, 
And  rather  chose  his  challenge  off  to  breake. 
Then  to  approve  his  right  with  speare  and  shield. 
And  rather  guilty  chose  him  selfe  to  yield.^ 

Only  by  imitating  Solomon  is  Artegall  able  to  discover  to  whom  the 
live  Ladie  belongs  and  who  is  the  murderer.  The  other  extreme  is 
represented  by  Sanglier,  the  robber  Pollente,  his  daughter  Munera, 
the  Gyant  with  the  huge  "ballance,"  and  so  on.  Like  Aristotle, 
Spenser  puts  the  emphasis  on  the  extreme  of  taking  too  much.  The 
opposite  of  general  Justice  is  represented  by  such  characters  as 
Grantorto  (Great  Wrong).  The  mean  is  seen  in  Artegall,  Arthur, 
Britomart,  and  Mercilla  (Equity). 

The  various  phases  of  Justice  discussed  by  Aristotle  are  clearly 
presented  by  Spenser,  such  as  distributive  justice,  corrective  justice, 
retaliation,  equity,  and  so  on.  Spenser  also  plainly  makes  Reason 
the  determiner  of  the  mean  in  respect  to  Justice.  See,  for  example, 
his  literal  exposition  of  Justice  in  V,  ix,  1  ff. 

Spenser's  sixth  virtue.  Courtesy,  is  not  only  treated  as  a  mean, 
but  is  exactly  Aristotle's  mean  in  regard  to  Friendliness.  As  we 
have  already  seen,  Aristotle  makes  Friendliness  consist  in  acting  as 
a  true  friend  would  act.^  He  makes  its  extremes  Surliness,  Conten- 
tiousness, Unfriendhness,  on  the  one  hand,  and  Flattery  and  Obsequi- 
ousness, or  Complaisance,  on  the  other.  His  friendly  man  is  pleasant 
.  to  live  with,  for  he  is  free  from  Surliness  or  Contentiousness;  but  he 
will  not  yield  his  approval  or  withhold  his  condemnation  when  wrong 
conduct  is  under  consideration.  This  is  why  he  is  like  a  true  friend. 
Here  we  have  exactly  the  character  of  Spenser's  Knight  of  Courtesy, 
as  is  shown,  for  example,  by  Spenser's  literal  exposition  of  Sir  Cali- 
dore's  Courtesy,  in  VI,  i,  2-3.     It  is  plain  that  the  Blatant  Beast, 

1  V,  i,  23.  24.  2  N.  Eth.,  IV,  xii. 


ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  THE  "FAERIE  QUEENE"    43 


which  Calidore,  the  Knight  of  Courtesy,  is  to  l)ind,  is  one  extreme 
in  regard  to  Courtesy.  Blandina'  represents  the  opposite  extreme. 
Calidore  is,  of  course,  the  mean.  Clearly  Spenser  puts  the  emphasis 
on  Surliness,  Contentiousness.  We  have  already  seen  that  Spenser 
develops  the  virtue  of  Courtesy  by  showing  its  opposites  and  by 
presenting  various  phases  of  the  virtue  and  of  its  opposites.  Further, 
that  Reason  is  the  determiner  of  the  right  course  in  regard  to  this 
virtue  Spenser  repeatedly  makes  clear.  Enias,  for  example,  appeals 
to  Arthur,  who  here  represents  Courtesy,  to  rescue — 

Yond  Lady  and  her  Squire  with  foule  despight 
Abusde,  against  all  reason  and  all  law.^ 

Thus  I  have  shown,  beyond  question,  I  hope,  that  Spenser  follows 
Aristotle  in  essentials.  Incidentally  many  correspondences  in  details 
have  been  pointed  out,  but  lack  of  space  makes  it  impossible  to  show 
how  numerous  such  correspondences  are. 

At  one  point  Spenser  interprets  his  Aristotle  with  considerable 
freedom.  He  assigns  Magnificence  to  Arthur,  "which  vertue,"  he 
says,  "for  that  (according  to  Aristotle  and  the  rest)  it  is  the  per- 
fection of  all  the  rest,  and  containeth  in  it  them  all,"  etc.^  Jusserand, 
conceiving  that  there  is  no  warrant  in  Aristotle  for  any  such  state- 
ment, says,  "He  follows  here,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  neither  Aristotle 
nor  the  rest."^  Jusserand  sees  in  Spenser's  statement  evidence^that 
the  poet's  recollection  of  Aristotle  was  vague,  and  he  finally  inti- 
mates— what  Professor  Erskine,  following  him,  states — that  Spenser 
probably  never  had  read  Aristotle's  Ethics. 

Now  suppose  we  could  demonstrate  that  Spenser's  memory  did 
fail  him  at  this  point,  that  he  actually  was  confused  as  to  the  Aris- 
totelian meaning  of  Magnificence  (fieyaXoirpeTHa) .  The  fact  would 
prove  little.  Greene,^  Herford,^  and  others  have  proved  that  Spenser 
more  than  once  forgot  the  thread  of  his  own  story  in  the  Faerie 
Queene.  If  a  slip  in  memory  is  evidence  that  Spenser  knew  little  of, 
and   had   probably   never   read,    Aristotle's   Ethics,   there   is  equal 

•  See  especially  VI,  vi,  41-42. 

2  VI,  viii,  6;  see  also  VI,  iii,  49. 

»  Letter  to  Sir  Walter  Raleigh. 

i  Mod.  Phil.,  Ill,  382. 

5  Pub.  Mod.  Lang.  Assoc,  IV,  173  ff. 

•  See  Professor  Child's  edition  of  Spenser's  poems,  note  to  I,  i,  52. 


44  ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  SPENSER 

evidence  that  he  knew  little  of,  and  had  probably  never  read,  the 
Faerie  Queene.  But  there  is  no  evidence  that  Spenser's  memory  did 
fail  him  at  this  point ;  and  there  is  much  evidence  that  it  did  not. 

Let  us  see  what  authority  exists  in  Aristotle  for  Spenser's  assign- 
ment of  Magnificence  to  the  morally  perfect  Arthur.  First  we  must 
decide  what  is  Aristotle.  Jusserand  says:  "Three  treatises  on 
morals  have  come  down  to  us  under  the  name  of  Aristotle;  one  alone, 
the  Nicomachean  Ethics,  being,  as  it  seems,  truly  his;  the  others 
appear  to  be  a  make-up,  drawn  from  his  teachings  by  some  disciples."^ 
This  is  a  kind  of  ex  post  facto  judgment.  Friedrich  D.  E.  Schleier- 
macher,  the  great  critic  and  AristoteUan  scholar,  born  one  hundred 
and  seventy  years  after  Spenser's  death,  held  that  the  Magna  Moralia 
was  the  source  of  the  Nicomachean  Ethics  and  of  the  Eudemian 
Ethics.-  Only  recently  have  scholars  begun  to  agree  that  the 
Nicomachean  Ethics  is  probably  the  most  truly  Aristotelian  of  the 
three.  An  uncritical  scholar  like  Spenser  would  certainly  have  made 
no  such  distinction.  He  would  simply  have  accepted  all  three  as 
the  teachings  of  Aristotle,  as  they  really  are. 

There  is  ample  warrant  in  Aristotle  for  the  idea  that  one  of  the 
moral  virtues  may  be  thought  of  as  containing  all  the  others.  For 
example,  it  is  clear  from  the  Nicomachean  Ethics  that  Magnanimity 
(I  have  elsewhere  used  the  term  Highmindedness)  would  fill  this 
requirement;^  for  although  Magnanimity,  or  Highmindedness,  is 
essentially  love  of  great  honor,  it  includes  moral  perfection  in  the 
fullest  sense.  Again,  on  the  same  authority  Justice,  in  the  broad 
sense,  includes  all  the  moral  virtues  so  far  as  one's  relations  to  others 
are  concerned.  But  under  Spenser's  plan,  set  forth  in  the  letter  to 
Raleigh,  the  virtue  assigned  to  Arthur  could  have  no  Book;  and 
Spenser  was  too  much  interested  in  church  matters  and  in  politics 
not  to  write  on  Holiness  and  Justice.  Besides,  there  would  be  a  kind 
of  impropriety  in  omitting  the  former;  probably  the  Scripture  text 
"Seek  ye  first  the  Kingdom  of  God  and  His  righteousness;  and  all 
these  things  shall  be  added  unto  you"  had  something  to  do,  not  only 
with  Spenser's  writing  on  Holiness,  but  also  with  his  treating  it 

J  Mod.  Phil.,  Ill,  374. 

'  The  Works  of  Aristotle,  Translated  into  English  under  the  Editorship  of  W.  D.  Ross: 
Magna  Moralia,  Ethica  Eudentia,  De  Virlulibus  et  Vitiis  (Oxford,  1915),  Introd.,  p.  v. 
'  iV.  Eth..  IV,  vii,  and  II,  vii. 


ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  THE  "FAERIE  QUEENE"    45 

first.  It  was  highly  desirable  then  to  reserve  Highmindedness,  or 
Magnanimity,  and  Justice  for  what  we  know  as  the  First  and  Fifth 
Books.  (If,  as  Jusserand  holds,  Spenser  had  already  written  the 
Book  on  Holiness  when  he  completed  the  plan  set  forth  in  his  letter 
to  Raleigh,  it  was  absolutely  necessary  to  leave  Highmindedness, 
jNIagnanimity,  as  the  virtue  of  the  Knight  of  Holiness;  for  it  would 
do  admirably  for  him,  and  no  other  virtue  would  do.)  Thus  if 
Spenser  could  assign  some  other  virtue  to  Arthur,  he  could  make  the 
plan  of  his  poem  more  elastic. 

Now  there  was  another  virtue  which  was  peculiarly  adapted  to 
Arthur,  provided  it  could  be  made  to  include  all  the  virtues — namely. 
Magnificence.  According  to  the  Nicomachean  Ethics,  "  Magnificence 
is  suitable  to  ...  .  persons  of  rank  and  reputation  and  the  like, 
as  all  these  advantages  confer  importance  and  dignity."^  Rank? 
Arthur's  was  the  highest.  Reputation  ?  Spenser  tells  us  in  the 
letter  to  Raleigh  that  it  was  because  of  Arthur's  reputation  that  he 
chose  him  as  the  hero  of  the  Faerie  Queene,  he  "being  made  famous 
by  many  men's  former  works."  Again,  the  magnificent  man  labors 
for  the  public  good  and  strives  for  honor.  Once  more,  "  The  motive 
of  the  magnificent  man  in  incurring  expense  will  be  nobleness;  for 
nobleness  is  a  characteristic  of  all  the  virtues."  "  In  a  word.  Magnifi- 
cence is  excellence  of  work  on  a  great  scale.  "^  What  could  better 
describe  Arthur's  great  works  ? 

But  can  Magnificence  be  made  to  include  all  the  virtues?  Al- 
though in  a  strict  sense  it  is  simply  a  mean  between  meanness  and 
vulgar  display  in  the  use  of  money,  it  seems  to  include  much  more. 
Moreover,  there  is,  as  we  have  already  seen,  abundant  authority  in 
the  Nicomachean  Ethics  for  taking  the  virtues  not  only  in  a  strict 
but  also  in  a  broad  or  metaphorical  sense.  If  Magnificence  were 
similarly  interpreted,  it  would  be  "the  perfection  of  all  the  rest  and 
contain  in  it  them  all."  But  all  this  is  from  the  Nicomachean  Ethics. 
What  do  Aristotle's  other  works  on  morals  say  about  Magnificence  ? 
The  Magna  Moralia  says:  "But  there  are,  as  people  think,  more 
kinds  of  Magnificence  than  one;  for  instance,  people  say,  'His  walk 
was  Magnificent,'  and  there  are  of  course  other  uses  of  the  term 

» IV,  iv:   II,  vii. 

2  Cf.  Aiistotle's  discussion  of  the  magnificent  man,  N.  Eth.,  IV,  iv-v. 


46  ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  SPENSER 

Magnificent  in  a  metaphorical,  not  in  a  strict,  sense."^  This  is 
certainly  suggestive.  And  according  to  the  Ethica  Eudemia,  "  The 
magnificent  man  is  not  concerned  with  an}'  and  every  action  or  choice, 
but  with  expenditure — unless  we  use  the  term  metaphorically."^ 
Here  is  a  plain  suggestion  that  Magnificence  could  be  taken  in  a 
broad  sense,  could  be  made  to  include  "any  and  every  action  or 
choice."  Such  is  Magnificence,  "according  to  Aristotle."  Who 
"the  rest"  are  is  not  quite  clear,  but  Spenser's  favorite  poet,  Chaucer, 
says  in  his  Persones  Tale,  "Thanne  comth  Magnificence,  that  is  to 
seyn,  whan  a  man  dooth  and  perfourneth  grete  werkes  of  goodnesse"' 
— exactly  what  Arthur  "dooth." 

We  come  now  to  Jusserand's  third  and  last  main  argument.  Jus- 
serand  contends  that  Spenser  did  not  get  his  virtues  from  Aristotle 
and  proceeds  to  argue  that  he  did  get  them  from  his  friend  Lodo- 
wick  Bryskett,  and  from  Piccolomini's  Istitutione  morale,  through 
Bryskett.  He  thus  finds  it  necessary  to  get  over  Spenser's  own 
assertion  that  he  did  take  his  virtues  from  Aristotle.  He  argues  that 
"Spenser  showed  as  a  rule  no  minute  accuracy  in  his  indications  of 
sources  and  models,  and  he  did  not  display  more  than  usual  in  this 
particular  case."^  The  first  part  of  the  proposition  is  true.  But  to 
find  that  "as  a  rule"  Spenser  showed  no  "minute  accuracy"  is  a 
vastly  different  thing  from  concluding  that  a  solemn  statement  con- 
cerning the  substance  of  his  whole  Faerie  Queene  is  "misleading, 
every  word  of  it." 

Let  us  examine  Jusserand's  argument^  that  Spenser  derived  his 
virtues  from  Bryskett,  and  from  Piccolomini  through  Bryskett. 
Long  after  Spenser's  death  Bryskett  published  A  Discourse  of  Civil 
Life,^  a  translation  from  Giraldi  Cinthio's  three  dialogues  DelV 
allevare  ei  ammaestrare  i  figluoli  nella  vita  civile.  It  is  an  account  of 
the  best  way  to  rear  children  and  includes  a  discussion  of  moral  virtues 
in  which  the  number  twelve  is  mentioned.  That  Spenser  knew  this 
Discourse  Jusserand  concludes  from  the  fact  that  Bryskett  represents 
Spenser  as  one  of  the  interlocutors  in  the  conversation  which  furnishes 
the  machinery  of  the  book.     Before  the  day  of  Spenser  and  Bryskett, 

»  I.  xxvi.  4  Mod.  Phil.,  Ill,  374. 

2  III.  vi.  6  Ibid.,  Ill,  37S-80. 

>  736  (§  61).  «  London.  1606. 


ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  THE  "FAERIE  QUEENE"    47 

Piccolomini,  taking  Aristotle  and  Plato  as  his  masters,  had  written  his 
Istitutione  morale,  in  which  he  discussed  eleven  moral  virtues  and 
added  the  statement  that  Prudence,  which  he  classed  as  an  intellectual 
virtue,  might  be  considered  a  moral  virtue,  Jusserand  holds  that 
"twelve  was  a  kind  of  sacred  number  and  was  sure  to  come  in." 
In  his  Discourse  Bryskett  states  that  when  he  came  to  the  question 
of  the  moral  virtues  he  found  that  Cinthio  had  treated  them  "some- 
W'hat  too  briefly  and  confusedly,"  and  adds,  "I  have  therefore,  to 
help  mine  own  understanding,  had  recourse  to  Piccolomini."^  Jus- 
serand takes  this  statement  as  "positive  testimony"  that  Spenser 
knew  the  substance  of  the  Istitutione  morale.  Jusserand  concludes: 
"From  such  books  and  such  conversations,  from  other  less  solemn 
talks  which  he  and  Bryskett,  interested  in  the  same  problems,  could 
not  fail  to  have,  Spenser  derived  his  list  of  virtues  and  his  ideas 
regarding  a  list  of  twelve.^' 

Now  it  is  quite  possible  that  Spenser,  the  genius,  should  get  his 
ideas  from  Lodowick  Bryskett,  a  man  of  no  great  parts.  It  is  also 
possible,  however  improbable,  that  Spenser  read  Bryskett's  book 
twenty  years  before  it  was  published.  But  there  is  no  proof,  or  even 
evidence,  that  such  was  the  case.  And,  by  the  same  token,  there  is 
no  evidence  that  Spenser  knew  Piccolomini's  Istitutione.  Professor 
Erskine  has  proved,  what  most  careful  students  must  already  have 
suspected,  that  Bryskett's  "conversation"  which  furnishes  Jusse- 
rand's  "positive  testimony"  is  a  myth.  In  putting  his  discussion 
into  the  form  of  a  dialogue  in  which  he  himself,  Spenser,  the  Bishop 
of  Armagh,  and  others  are  the  speakers,  Bryskett  is  simply  following 
a  literary  convention  of  the  day.  It  is  impossible  to  suppose  all  the 
characters  of  the  dialogue  actually  together  at  Bryskett's  cottage.^ 
Besides,  Erskine  finds  that  the  speeches  which  Bryskett  puts  into 
the  mouths  of  Spenser  and  the  good  Bishop  of  Armagh  are  trans- 
lated straight  from  Giraldi  Cinthio.  He  finds  further  that  even 
if  the  dialogue  had  been  a  real  one  it  could  have  had  little  to  do  with 
Piccolomini,  for  it  contains  only  one  passage  from  him.  It  may  be 
added  that  Bryskett  could  have  taken  the  idea  for  the  machinery 
of  his  Discourse  from  Spenser's  Mother  Huhberds  Tale.     In  both  cases 

•  Mod.  Phil.,  Ill,  378-80. 

»  Pub.  Mod.  Lang.  Assoc,  XXIII,  831-50. 


48  ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  SPENSER 

the  author  is  sick,  his  friends  come  in  to  see  him,  and  the  conversation 
which  is  later  given  to  the  reader  takes  place.  The  only  difference 
is  that  Bryskett  is  so  anxious  to  take  the  credit  of  authorship  that 
he  commits  the  absurdity  of  having  the  sick  man,  Bryskett  himself, 
do  the  talking,  which  consists  in  lecturing  on  philosophy  for  three 
days. 

In  the  next  place,  even  if  Spenser  had  known  Bryskett's  Discourse, 
he  could  not  have  taken  his  virtues  and  the  plan  of  his  Faerie  Queene 
from  it.  For  one  reason,  Spenser's  and  Bryskett's  virtues  are  unUke 
in  nature.  For  example,  Bryskett,  like  Plato,  makes  Prudence  one 
of  the  moral  virtues,  whereas  Spenser,  as  we  have  already  seen,  fol- 
lows Aristotle  in  making  it  that  intellectual  virtue  which  determines 
the  mean  in  the  case  of  each  of  the  moral  virtues.  Again,  Bryskett 
makes  Magnanimity  a  subordinate  virtue,  whereas  Spenser,  like 
Aristotle,  makes  it  include  all  the  moral  virtues.  Moreover,  Spenser's 
basis  of  classification  is  quite  different  from  Bryskett's.  In  Brys- 
kett's classification,  to  quote  his  own  words,  "  There  are  ....  four 
principall  vertues  ....  from  which  four  are  also  derived  (as 
branches  from  their  trees)  sundry  others  to  make  up  the  number 
twelve,"^  whereas  Spenser,  like  Aristotle,  makes  one  of  his  virtues 
include  all  the  others.  Finally,  even  the  agreement  in  point  of 
number,  which  Jusserand  would  make  much  of,  does  not  exist. 
Bryskett's  number  is  twelve,  Spenser's  thirteen.  And  Spenser's 
plan  of  his  poem,  set  forth  in  the  letter  to  Raleigh,  would  have  been 
impossible  with  any  other  number  of  virtues  than  thirteen.  Thus  it 
is  plain  that  Spenser  did  not  get  his  virtues  from  Bryskett. 

»  Quoted  by  Jusserand.  Mod.  Phil.,  III.  380. 


"MUTABILITY" 

Little  is  known  of  the  history  of  the  fragment  called  "Muta- 
bility." The  fragment  was  first  published  in  1609,  ten  years  after 
the  poet's  death.  It  then  appeared  under  the  following  title,  which 
all  editors  have  retained:  "Two  Cantos  of  Mutability:  Which,  both 
for  Forme  and  Matter,  appeare  to  be  parcell  of  some  following  Booke 
of  the  Faerie  Queene,  under  the  legend  of  Constansie.  Never  before 
imprinted."     Not  another  word  of  explanation  was  given. 

The  fragment  has  been  a  puzzle  to  editors.  Dr.  Grosart  in  his 
biography  of  Spenser,  Volume  I  of  his  nine-volume  edition  of  Spenser's 
works,  speaks  of  it  as  "fragments"  which  show  that  Spenser  had 
started  on  a  "second  six"  books,  to  round  out  the  proposed  twelve. 
Thus  he  makes  it  a  part  of  the  Faerie  Queene,  and  seems  to  expect  to 
find  other  fragments.  But  by  the  time  he  has  reached  Volume  VIII 
of  his  massive  edition,  and  is  ready  to  print  the  fragment,  he  has 
changed  his  mind.  He  now  prefixes  to  the  Two  Cantos  on  Mutability 
the  following  note : 

It  is  doubtful  whether  they  were  meant  to  form  part  of  the  Faery  Queene. 
They  make  a  charming  independent  poem  on  "  Mutability  " — one  of  Spenser's 
favorite  themes. 

Professor  Child  contents  himself  with  printing  them  under  the  head- 
ing, "Book  VII(  ?)."  The  Oxford  edition  disposes  of  the  whole  matter 
in  a  single  sentence.  It  says  simply:  "The  fragmentary  Book  VII 
appeared  first  in  the  Folio  of  1609."  Professor  Dodge  says  that  the 
best  reason  for  thinking  that  the  fragment  was  intended  to  form  part 
of  the  Faerie  Queene  is  found  in  stanza  37  of  the  first  of  the  "Two 
Cantos.  "1 

Besides  the  matter  of  its  relation  to  Aristotle,  there  are,  then, 
other  interesting  questions  connected  with  "Mutability."  Was  it 
written  as  an  independent  poem?  If  not,  where  does  it  belong? 
Was  it  intended  to  be  a  part  of  the  Faerie  Queene  f 

It  is  hard  to  believe  that  "Mutability"  was  written  as  an  inde- 
pendent poem.     It  is  a  unit,  a  great  poem,  in  itself,  as  everyone  must 

1  Cambridge  ed.,  1908,  p.  131. 

49 


50  ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  SPENSER 

observe.  But  it  is  the  two  stanzas  of  canto  viii  that  complete  it. 
And  these  could  easily  have  been  added  after  the  fragment  was 
detached  from  the  poem  for  which  it  was  originally  intended.  Or 
they  may  well  have  been  a  part  of  the  fragment;  for  they  are  in 
accord  with  Spenser's  usual  practice  in  the  Faerie  Queene,  of  beginning 
a  canto  with  reflections  on  the  preceding  one.  One  reason  for 
regarding  "Mutability"  as  a  fragment  is  the  numbering  of  the 
cantos.  If  it  was  written  as  an  independent  poem,  why  the  num- 
bering as  we  have  it— "Canto  VI,"  "Canto  VII,"  "The  VIII.  Canto, 
unperfite"?  Closely  connected  with  this  is  the  presence  of  the 
proems  which  introduce  cantos  vi  and  vii.  Surely  these  features  are 
not  the  work  of  the  printer.  Again,  a  sufficient  reason  for  doubting 
that  what  we  have  here  was  written  as  an  independent  poem  is  the 
fact  that  Spenser  tells  us  in  "Mutability,"  vi,  37,  that  this  is  part  of 
a  poem  deahng  with  "warres  and  Knights,"  and  in  the  part  that  we 
have  no  knights  appear. 

It  seems  clear  that  "Mutability"  is  part  of  an  epic.  Stanza  37 
of  canto  vi,  especially  when  compared  with  Faerie  Queerie,  I,  Prol.  1, 
can  hardly  leave  a  doubt  on  this  point.     The  stanzas  are  as  follows : 

"Mutabihty,"  vi,  37: 

And,  were  it  not  ill  fitting  for  this  file, 

To  sing  of  hilles  and  woods,  mongst  warres  and  Knights, 

I  would  abate  the  slernenesse  of  my  stile, 

Mongst  these  sterne  stounds  to  mingle  soft  delights; 

And  tell  how  Arlo  through  Dianaes  spights 

(Being  of  old  the  best  and  fairest  Hill 

That  was  in  all  this  holy  Islands  hights) 

Was  made  the  most  unpleasant,  and  most  ill. 

Meane  while,  0  Clio,  lend  Calliope  thy  quill. 

Faerie  Queene,  I,  Prol.  1 : 

Lo  I  the  man,  whose  Muse  whilome  did  maske. 

As  tiine  her  taught,  in  lowly  Shepheards  weeds, 

Am  now  enforst  a  far  unfitter  task, 

For  trumpets  skr7ie  to  chaunge  mine  Oaten  reeds. 

And  sing  of  Knights  and  Ladies  gentle  deeds; 

^^^^ose  prayses  having  slept  in  silence  long, 

Me,  all  too  meane,  the  sacred  Muse  areeds 

To  blazon  broad  emongst  her  learned  throng: 

Fierce  ivarres  and  faitliful  loves  shall  moralize  my  song. 


"MUTABILITY"  51 

Note  that  in  "Mutability,"  vi,  37,  Spenser  not  only  shows  that  what 
he  is  now  writing  is  part  of  a  poem  dealing  with  "  warres  and  Knights," 
but  he  speaks  of  the  ''sternenesse"  of  his  present  *' stile"  and  of 
"these  sterne  stounds,"  just  as  in  Faerie  Queene,  I,  Prol.  1,  where 
he  is  passing  from  his  pastoral  Shepheardes  Calender  to  his  epic 
Faerie  Queene,  he  speaks  of  changing  his  " Oaten  reeds "  for  "trumpets 
sterne."  Again,  in  "Mutability,"  vi,  37,  besides  the  mention  of  the 
sternness  of  his  epic  style,  Spenser  gives  unmistakable  testimony 
that  he  is  here  writing  epic  poetry.  Wishing  "mongst  these  sterne 
stounds"  to  tell  the  story  of  how  Arlo  became  cursed,  the  poet 
prays  Clio,  the  muse  of  history,  to  lend  her  quill  to  Calliope,  the 
muse  of  epic  poetry.  It  is  therefore  clear  that  what  has  been  written 
up  to  this  point  is  conceived  as  epic  poetry — the  work  of  Calliope. 

If,  then,  "Mutability"  was  written  as  part  of  an  epic  poem,  does 
it  belong  to  the  Faerie  Queene  or  to  some  other  epic  ?  First,  what 
do  we  know  of  Spenser's  plans  for  writing  epic  poetry  ?  We  know, 
from  the  famous  letter  to  Raleigh,  that  Spenser  had  planned  to  write 
six  more  books  on  moral  virtues.  There  were  to  be  twelve  books  in 
the  first  part  of  Faerie  Queene.  We  know,  too,  from  the  same  source, 
that,  besides  "these  first  twelve  books,"  Spenser  had  it  in  mind  to 
write  an  "other  part"  to  the  Faerie  Queene,  which  probably  would 
have  been  twelve  books  in  length,  making  twenty-four  books  in  the 
completed  Faerie  Queene.  This  "other  part"  was  to  be  on  poKtical 
virtues. 

In  addition  to  the  plans  set  forth  in  the  letter  to  Raleigh,  Spenser 
makes  certain  other  references  to  epic  poetry  which  he  intends  to 
write.  Professor  Child  has  pointed  out  that  "Spenser  once  or  twice 
gives  intimation  of  a  purpose  of  commemorating  the  wars  between 
the  Faerie  Queene  and  the  Paynim  King,  that  is.  Queen  Elizabeth 
and  Philip  of  Spain."  He  cites  the  Faerie  Queene,  I,  xi,  7,  and  I, 
xii,  18,  and  Spenser's  verses  to  the  Earl  of  Essex,  prefixed  to  the 
Faerie  Queene,  and  adds:  "This  intention,  however,  was  never  fully 
carried  out:  all  that  the  poet  wrote  upon  the  subject  will  be  found  in 
the  last  cantos  of  the  fifth  book."'  But  in  these  passages  Spenser 
seems  to  be  thinking  of  a  discussion  which  he  expects  to  introduce 
somewhere  in  the  Faerie  Queene,  perhaps  in  Book  V,  perhaps  in 

•  The  Political  Works  of  Edmund  Spenser  (in  British  Poets),  I  (1855),  231. 


52  ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  SPENSER 

Book  XII,  possibly  in  the  Second  Part,  which  is  to  deal  with  political 
virtues.  The  following  line  from  the  verses  to  Essex  would  seem  to 
indicate  a  position  at  the  close  of  the  Faerie  Qiieene:  "To  the  last 
praises  of  this  Faerie  Queene."  So  far  as  we  know,  Spenser  had  no 
other  epic  poetry,  than  what  we  have  mentioned,  in  mind  or  under 
way. 

Apparently,  then,  "Mutability"  was  written  as  a  part  of  the 
Faerie  Queene,  either  of  "these  first  twelve  bookes"  or  of  "the  other 
part."  And  there  are  several  additional  facts  which  make  this  con- 
clusion probable.  The  fragment  is  in  the  form  of  the  Faerie  Queene. 
It  is  divided  into  cantos  like  the  Faerie  Queene.  The  cantos  are 
summarized  in  a  proem,  as  is  the  case  in  the  Faerie  Queene.  And 
the  stanza  form  is  that  of  the  Faerie  Queene.  Again,  a  comparison 
of  "Mutability,"  vi,  37,  and  Faerie  Queene,  I,  Prol.  1,  already 
quoted,  indicates  that  the  fragment  was  written  as  a  part  of  the 
Faerie  Queene.  Note  in  both  passages  the  reference  to  knights, 
"warres,"  and  the  sternness  of  style  demanded  by  epic  poetry. 
Spenser's  usual  meaning  for  the  word  "warres"  is  combats  between 
two  or  more  knights.^  Furthermore,  all  the  characters  of  the 
fragment  are  frequently  mentioned  in  the  Faerie  Queene.  Even  its 
personification  of  rivers  is  a  theme  which  is  dwelt  on  at  length  in  the 
Faerie  Queene.-  And  the  "records"  of  Mutability's  "antique  race 
and  linage  ancient"  are  found  registered  "in  Faery  Land."^ 

Seeing  that  "MutabiHty"  was  probably  written  to  occupy  some 
place  in  the  Faerie  Queene,  one  cannat  refrain  from  asking,  Where  ? 
This  question  is  more  difficult  than  the  preceding  ones.  Realizing 
that  the  known  facts  are  insufficient  for  a  conclusive  answer,  one 
may  nevertheless  suggest  a  probable  explanation. 

The  fragment  may  be,  not,  as  the  printer  guessed,  "parcell  of 
some  following  Booke  of  the  Faerie  Queene,''  but  rejected  cantos 
from  a  preceding  book.  The  fact  that  it  is  the  middle  of  a  book,  not 
the  beginning,  as  is  shown  by  the  numbering  of  the  cantos,  suggests 
this.  It  is  improbable  that  any  such  vast  amount  of  Spenser's 
poetry  was  lost  as  would  be  represented  by  five  cantos  of  the  Faerie 

>  See,  for  example,  F.Q.,  V,  ii,  17. 

« IV,  xi. 

»  "  iMutability,"  vi,  2. 


"MUTABILITY"  53 

Queene,  or  five  such  cantos  as  the  two  we  have  in  the  fragment — 
some  twenty-seven-hundred  verses.  And  it  is  improbable  that 
Spenser  would  begin  a  book  in  the  middle.  If  it  were  his  practice 
to  outline  a  book  in  detail  before  writing  in  extenso,  he  might  be 
moved  to  develop  a  topic  in  the  middle  or  at  the  end  of  a  book  before 
he  had  developed  the  beginning,  and  he  would,  of  course,  be  able  to 
assign  the  proper  number  to  each  canto.  But  there  is  no  evidence 
that  that  was  his  practice;  and  there  is  evidence,  both  internal  and 
external,  that  it  was  not.  Professor  Erskine,  basing  his  reasoning 
on  Books  III  and  IV  and  Spenser's  letter  to  Raleigh,  has  pointed  out 
that  Spenser  could  have  had  no  outline  of  Book  IV  at  the  time  when 
the  first  three  books  were  published.^  But  there  are  other  reasons 
for  thinking  that  the  fragment  is  rejected  cantos  from  a  preceding 
book.  Change,  or  Fortune,  was  a  favorite  theme  with  Spenser.  In 
whatever  he  wrote  he  could  be  counted  on  to  discuss  Change.  We 
do  not  have  to  argue  as  to  whether  he  could  have  put  a  discussion  of 
Change  in  any  one  of  Books  I- VI;  he  did  put  it  in,  most  notably  in 
Books  III  and  V.  It  would  be  easy  for  him  in  any  of  his  books  to 
launch  into  a  long  discussion  of  Change. 

Before  attempting  to  see  whether  the  fragment  would  fit  in 
some  one  of  the  completed  books  of  the  Faerie  Queene,  we  should 
observe,  however,  that  Spenser  would  not  be  likely  to  remove  so 
great  a  portion  of  a  book  as  is  represented  by  the  fragment  without 
making  some  changes  in  what  preceded  and  followed  the  rejected 
portion.  It  is  conceivable  that  the  fragment  was  part  of  a  first 
draft  of  some  book  the  remainder  of  which  was  reworked  and 
given  to  us.  A  reason  for  rejection  might  be  the  great  length  to 
which  the  fragment  runs  without  carrying  on  any  thread  of  the  story 
of  the  Faerie  Queene.  There  are  digressions  in  Books  II  and  IV 
which  are  nearly''  a  canto  in  length,  or  half  as  long  as  the  fragment; 
but  Guyon  and  Arthur  read  the  long  chronicles,  and  Marinell  and 
his  mother  are  present  at  the  marriage  of  the  Medway  and  the 
Thames.  Again,  the  fragment  might  be  rejected  on  the  basis  of 
tact  or  patriotism,  as  we  shall  see  later.  Finally,  the  fact  that  they 
are  a  unit  in  themselves,  suitable  to  be  published  as  a  separate  poem, 
would  make  rejection  easy. 

1  Pub.  Mod.  Lang.  Assoc,  XXIII,  831-50. 


54  ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  SPENSER 

How  would  the  fragment  fit  in  Book  II,  Spenser's  discussion  of 
Temperance  ?  It  will  be  remembered  that  the  fragment  is  divided 
into  "Canto  VI/'  "Canto  VII,"  and  "The  VIII.  Canto,  unperfite." 
How  would  these  cantos  fit  between  canto  v  of  Book  II  and  what  is 
now  canto  vi  of  Book  II  ?  At  the  close  of  II,  v,  Cymochles  (Incon- 
tinence) has  been  roused' by  Atin  from  his  bed  of  lust  and  led  to 
avenge  his  brother  Pyrochles '  defeat  and  apparent  death  at  the  hands 
of  Sir  Guyon,  the  Knight  of  Temperance.  He  rides  forth  determined 
"to  beene  avenged  that  day"  on  Sir  Guyon.  He  is  impatient  to 
avenge  the  defeat  of  his  brother.^  So  ends  canto  v.  In  II,  vi, 
Cymochles  meets  the  beautiful  Phaedria  (Temptation  to  Incon- 
tinence) before  he  reaches  Sir  Guyon.  He  is  easily  led  by  Phaedria 
through  the  Lake  of  Idleness  to  her  wandering  island  (Incontinence), 
where  he  forgets  all  about  his  purpose  to  avenge  his  brother's  death. 
It  would  seem  that  between  Cymochles'  determination  to  avenge 
the  defeat  of  his  brother  and  his  being  led  into  Incontinence  in  which 
he  forgets  all  about  his  brother — here  it  would  seem  that  the  frag- 
ment would  fit  neatly.  It  is  Spenser's  practice  to  begin  a  canto  with 
reflections  on  what  has  passed,  in  the  story,  and  what  is  to  follow. 
Once  launched  into  a  discussion  of  Change,  or  Constancy,  he  might 
be  led  to  pursue  the  subject  to  some  definite  stopping-place.  It 
would  be  in  accord  with  Spenser's  practice  to  drop  the  story  of 
Cymochles  for  a  long  time.  He  might  not  realize  until  later  that 
he  had  here  carried  on  no  thread  of  the  story  of  the  Faerie 
Queene. 

Would  the  fragment  fit  in  Book  III  ?  There  is  a  curious  resem- 
blance between  the  material  of  cantos  vi-vii  of  the  fragment  and  that 
of  cantos  vi-vii  of  Book  III.  In  III,  vi-vii,  we  have  Diana  and 
Belphoebe,  who,  as  we  know  from  the  letter  to  Raleigh,  represent 
Chastity  and  Elizabeth.  In  the  fragment,  vi-vii,  we  have  the  moon- 
goddess  Diana,  or  Cynthia,  or  Phoebe,  whose  throne  is  attacked  by 
Mutability.  Besides  the  moon-goddess  Diana,  we  have  in  the 
fragment  a  nineteen-stanza  account  of  Diana  as  a  virgin  huntress. 
The  privacy  of  her  bath  is  invaded  by  the  licentious  Faunus,  for 
which  Faunus  is  punished  and  the  country  cursed.     Again,  in  III, 

» IT.  V.  38. 


"MUTABILITY"  55 

vi-vii,  we  have  not  only  a  discussion  of  Change,  but  a  development 
of  the  idea  that  Change  is  in  a  Cycle,  and  that  essentially  there  is 
no  Change.  The  fragment,  vi-vii,  consists  of  a  discussion  of  Change 
as  a  Cycle,  and  the  same  conclusion  is  reached  as  in  III,  vi-vii. 
Compare  III,  vi,  46-47,  and  III,  vi,  36-41,  especially  37-38,  with  the 
fragment,  especially  with  fragment  vii,  58.  Once  more,  in  both  III, 
vi-vii,  and  the  fragment  we  have  an  impressive  use  of  the  figure  of 
the  Wheel.  Compare  III,  vi,  32-33,  with  the  fragment,  vi,  1.  Yet 
again,  in  III,  vi-vii,  we  have  the  horrible  lustful  giant  twins,  Argante 
and  Otyphant,  who  certainly  represent  Aristotle's  "unnatural  vice," 
as  is  clear  from  a  comparison  of  III,  vii,  47-50,  with  the  Nicomachean 
Ethics,  Book  VII,  and  who  are  descendants  of  Titan,  who  fought 
against  Jove.  They  "feed  [their]  fancy  with  delightful  change." 
In  the  fragment.  Change,  or  Mutability,  is  a  descendant  of  Titan, 
who  fought  against  Jove.  Important  ideas  in  both  III,  vi-vii,  and 
the  fragment,  vi-vii,  are  Nature,  cyclic  Change,  Time,  and  Death. 

If  one  could  accept  the  printer's  improbable  conjecture  that 
"Mutability"  is  a  moral  discussion  on  Constancy,  that  would  be 
another  reason  for  placing  the  fragment  in  Book  II  or  III,  in  both 
of  which  Spenser  discusses  Constancy.  If  the  fragment  is  on  Con- 
stancy in  the  moral  sense  of  Continence  and  Steadfastness,  it  is  on 
Temperance  or  Chastity,  and  belongs  to  Book  II  or  III.  Spenser 
would  certainly  not  write  another  Book  so  like  Temperance  and 
Chastity. 

How  would  the  fragment  fit  in  the  Book  on  Justice  ?  Nothing 
impressed  the  Renaissance  like  the  rise  and  fall  of  individual  men,  the 
downfall  of  men  at  the  height  of  their  prosperity,  the  turn  of  the 
wheel  of  Fortune.  Now  in  canto  v  of  Book  V,  which  the  fragment, 
according  to  the  numbering  of  its  cantos,  would  follow,  Artegall, 
the  hero  of  the  Book  and  the  equal  of  Arthur,  has  fallen  from  the 
state  of  one  of  the  greatest  knights  in  the  world  to  that  of  bond 
servant  to  a  woman.  She  has  degraded  him  from  his  rank  of 
Chivalry,  dressed  him  in  women's  weeds,  and  set  him  to  do  woman's 
work.  But  Artegall  is  not  merely  the  hero  of  a  tale.  He  is  Arthur, 
Lord  Grey,  who  had  been  Spenser's  personal  friend,  patron,  and 
hero  in  real  life.  How  naturally,  then,  would  the  opening  stanza  of 
canto  vi  of  the  fragment  follow  Artegall's  fall  in  canto  v  of  Book  V, 


56  ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  SPENSER 

especially  in  view  of  the  fact  that  Spenser  habitually  begins  a  canto 
with  reflections  on  the  preceding  one : 

What  man  that  sees  the  ever-whirling  wheele 
Of  Change,  the  which  all  mortall  things  doth  sway, 
But  that  therby  doth  find,  and  plainly  feele, 
How  Mutabihty  in  them  doth  play 
Her  cruell  sports,  to  many  mens  decay  ? 

The  proem  might  not  be  written  until  the  canto  was  finished,  as 
is  indicated  by  the  fact  that  the  "unperfite"  canto  viii  has  no  proem. 
The  word  "decay"  would  not  necessarily  mean  death,  for  the  same 
word  is  applied  in  V,  v,  to  those  who,  like  Artegall,  have  fallen  from 
knighthood  and  become  subject  to  Radigund.^  Perhaps  the  refer- 
ences to  Fortune  in  V,  iv,  47;  V,  v,  5;  V,  v,  36,  and  V,  v,  38,  are  too 
much  the  usual  thing  in  Spenser  to  be  significant,  though  Radigund's 
and  Artegall's  anxiety  as  to  how  Fortune  will  decide  their  combat 
seems  so. 

But  Artegall  represents  also  Justice.  His  downfall,  therefore, 
represents  in  some  sense  the  miscarriage  of  Justice.  Does  it  suggest 
the  recall  of  Lord  Grey  from  the  Lord-Deputyship  of  Ireland  and  the 
reversal  of  his  policy  by  Sir  John  Perrot,  which,  as  we  know,  from 
the  last  canto  of  Book  V,  and  especially  from  Spenser's  Veue  of  the 
Present  State  of  Ireland,  the  poet  condemned?  We  are  told  that 
Radigund's  treatment  of  Artegall  is  just,  because  he  had  given  his 
word  that  if  she  defeated  him  he  would  obey  her;  but  we  are  made 
to  feel  that  it  is  contemptible.  If  following  cantos  were  rejected, 
V,  V,  might  be  changed ;  but  even  as  it  now  stands,  woman's  govern- 
ment, save  Elizabeth  of  course,  is  plainly  condemned  as  against 
Nature.^ 

The  probability  of  the  rejection  of  the  fragment  on  the  ground 
of  tact  or  patriotism  will  now  be  clear.  If  the  long  discussion  of 
Change,  or  Mutability,  grew  out  of  the  downfall  of  Artegall  at  the 
hand  of  a  woman  and  Artegall's  humiliation  under  woman's  govern- 
ment, so  that  the  discussion  would  be  likely  to  suggest  not  only  a 
condemnation  of  Lord  Grey's  recall  but  also  of  EHzabeth's  govern- 
ment, it  might  well  occur  to  Spenser,  on  second  thought,  or  be  sug- 
gested to  him  by  Raleigh,  that  here  is  a  delicate  matter.     And  the 

>  V,  V,  21.  2  V,  V,  25. 


"MUTABILITY"  57 

same  would  be  true  if  the  discussion  of  Mutability  grew  out  of  any 
similar  event.  Again,  the  Cynthia,  or  Phoebe,  or  Diana,  of  the 
fragment  could  not  fail  to  suggest  Elizabeth,  not  only  because  all 
the  court  commonly  used  these  terms  to  flatter  Elizabeth,  but  also 
because  Spenser  himself  had  so  used  them  in  the  Faerie  Queene  and 
had  pointed  out  in  the  letter  to  Raleigh  that  they  did  refer  to  Eliza- 
beth. In  view  of  this  fact,  the  nineteen-stanza  account,  in  the  frag- 
ment, of  Faunus'  spying  on  Diana  at  her  bath  might,  for  example, 
be  a  reason  for  the  rejection  of  the  fragment. 

I  have  tried  to  suggest  that  the  fragment  called  "Mutability" 
may  have  been  written  as  a  part  of  one  of  the  completed  books  of 
the  Faerie  Queene.  If  it  be  argued  that  it  does  not  fit  perfectly  in 
any  of  them,  this  answer  seems  worthy  of  consideration:  Spenser 
probably  rejected  it  just  because  it  did  not  fit  perfectly. 

Finally,  the  long  discussion  of  Change,  or  Mutability,  might 
conceivably  have  grown  out  of  the  downfall  of  some  great  character 
in  the  "other  part"  of  the  Faerie  Queene,  which  was  to  deal  with 
political  virtues.  But  in  the  absence  of  any  books  on  pohtical 
virtues,  this  solution  seems  improbable. 

We  come  now  to  the  question  of  Aristotle's  influence  on  "Muta- 
bility." Here  it  will  be  well  to  review  the  plot  of  the  poem.  Change 
has  brought  sin  and  death  and  injustice  into  the  world,  and  subdued 
the  earth  to  her  rule.  Having  done  this  much,  she  aspires  to  rule 
the  heavens.  She  begins  by  attempting  to  displace  Cynthia,  or 
Phoebe,  or  Diana,  the  moon-goddess.  Jove  interferes,  and  Muta- 
bility boldly  tells  him  that  she  intends  to  have  his  throne  too,  and 
all  the  gods'.  She  bases  her  claim  on  the  fact  that  she  is  a  descendant 
of  Titan,  whom  Jove  had  dispossessed.  Jove  starts  to  try  the  case; 
but  Mutability,  feeling  that  he  would  be  partial  to  his  own  interest, 
appeals  to  the  God  of  Nature.  Heaven  and  Earth  assemble,  and 
Nature  takes  the  judgment  seat.  In  addition  to  her  claim  through 
inheritance,  Mutability,  or  Change,  pleads  that  in  reahty  she  is  the 
supreme  ruler;  for  earth,  air,  fire,  water;  seasons,  months,  day  and 
night;  life  and  death;  the  planets  in  the  heavens;  and  even  the 
gods,  including  Jove  himself,  are  subject  to  her  law  of  change. 
Nature  is  long  silent,  but  at  length  gives  her  decision  in  few  words. 
It  is  true,  she  says,  that  all  things  hate  steadfastness,  and  are  changed. 


58  ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  SPENSER 

But  essentially  they  are  not  changed.  They  change  in  a  cycle; 
"they  are  not  changed  from  their  first  estate";  they  only  dilate  their 
being  and  perfect  themselves.  Change  does  not  rule  over  them; 
"but  they  raigne  over  change,  and  do  their  states  maintaine." 
Mutability  shall  not  displace  Jove,  but  shall  give  up  her  aspira- 
tions and  content  herself  to  be  ruled  by  Nature.  Thus  shall  Change 
be  governed  until  the  time  comes  when  we  shall  all  be  changed. 
After  that  there  will  be  no  more  Change. 

Several  of  the  ideas  of  the  fragment  are  strikingly  like  those  of 
Aristotle.  For  example,  the  idea  of  cyclic  Change  and  of  the  rule 
of  Nature  is  repeatedly  expressed  in  the  Nicomachean  Ethics  and 
in  the  Politics.     In  Politics  VIII,  xii,  Aristotle  says: 

In  the  Republic  the  subject  of  revolutions  is  discussed  by  Socrates,  but 
not  satisfactorily.  For  there  is  no  particular  treatment  of  the  revolution 
incident  to  his  best  or  primary  polity.  He  assigns  as  a  cause  the  fact  that 
nothing  in  the  world  is  permanent;  all  things  change  in  a  certain  cycle,  .... 

Again,  in  Politics,  Book  I,  Aristotle  discusses  at  length  the  rule  and 

subordination  which  is  in  accordance  with  Nature.     He  shows  that 

the  principle  of  rule  and  subordination  prevails  throughout  Nature. 

For  example,  he  says: 

Wherever  several  parts  combine  to  form  one  common  whole  ....  the 
relation  of  ruler  and  subject  invariably  manifests  itself.  And  this  fact 
which  is  characteristic  of  animate  things  is  true  of  Nature  generally;  for 
even  in  inanimate  things  there  is  a  sort  of  rule  and  subordination,  e.g.  in 
harmony.^ 

Connected  with  Spenser's  fragment,  and  with  Aristotle's  study 

of  virtue,  there  is  an  interesting  bit  of  theology.     It  is  "mortall" 

things,  Spenser  tells  us  in  the  very  first  sentence  of  the  fragment 

and  throughout  the  poem,  that  are  subject  to  Change.     In  that 

happy  condition  before  Change  broke  the  laws  of  Nature  and  brought 

sin  and  death  into  the  world,  that  is,  before  man  became  mortal,  man 

and  all  things  enjoyed  a  state  which  was  without  change  and  without 

motion.^     And,  Spenser  tells  us,  clearly  with  a  part  of  the  fifteenth 

chapter  of  First  Corinthians  in  mind, 

Time  shall  come  that  all  shall  changed  be. 

And  from  thenceforth,  none  no  more  change  shall  see. 

•  Politics,  I,  V. 

2  Compare  the  opening  stanzas  of  the  fragment,  especially  stanzas  5  and  6,  with 
the  close,  especially  vii,  59,  and  viii,  2. 


"MUTABILITY"  59 

In  other  words,  there  is  to  be  a  return  to  the  pre-Mutability  state. 
Then,  commenting  on  this  fact,  which  is  announced  by  Nature, 
Spenser  says:  y 

Then  gin  I  think  on  that  which  Nature  sayd,  ^ 

Of  that  same  time  when  no  more  Change  shall  be, 

But  steadfast  rest  of  all  things  firmly  stayd 

Upon  the  pillours  of  Eternity, 

That  is  contrayr  to  Mutabilitie: 

For,  all  that  moveth,  doth  in  Change  dehght: 

But  thence-forth  all  shall  rest  eternally 

With  Him  that  is  the  God  of  Sabbaoth  hight: 

0  that  great  Sabbaoth  God,  graunt  me  that 

Sabaoths  sight. ^ 

At  the  close  of  Book  VII  of  the  Nicomachean  Ethics  Aristotle 
gives  a  brief  and  unmistakably  clear  expression  of  this  doctrine  of  a 
changeless  and  motionless  state  of  bliss.  It  precisely  matches,  in 
this  respect,  the  closing  stanza  of  Spenser's  poem  on  Mutabihty,  or 
Change.     It  is  as  follows: 

The  same  thing  is  never  constantly  pleasant  to  us,  as  our  nature  is  not 
simple,  but  there  exists  in  us  a  sort  of  second  nature,  which  makes  us  mortal 
beings.  Thus  if  one  element  is  active,  it  acts  against  the  nature  of  the  other, 
and  when  the  two  elements  are  in  equilibrium,  the  action  appears  to  be 
neither  painful  nor  pleasant.  If  there  were  a  being,  whose  nature  is  simple, 
the  same  action  would  always  be  supremely  pleasant  to  him. 

It  is  thus  that  God  enjoys  one  simple  pleasure  everlastingly;  for  there 
is  an  activity  not  only  of  motion  but  of  immobility,  and  pleasure  consists  rather 
in  rest  than  in  motion. 

Much  of  Aristotle's  teaching  concerning  the  active  and  the  specu- 
lative life,  and  the  superiority  of  the  latter,  had  probably  become  so 
merged  with  Christian  teaching  as  to  lose  its  identity.  The  emphasis 
placed  by  Spenser  on  a  motionless  state  of  bliss,  at  the  close  of 
"Mutability,"  suggests,  however,  that  the  poet  had  particularly  in 
mind  the  ideas  which  we  have  just  quoted  from  Aristotle — not 
solely  the  common  doctrines  of  the  church  on  eschatology.  And 
this  is  the  more  probable  in  view  of  the  fact  that,  as  we  saw  when 
studying  the  Faerie  Queene,  Spenser  had  elsewhere  made  frequent 
use,  not  only  of  the  ideas  of  the  Nicomachean  Ethics,  but  of  this  very 
book. 

>  "Mutability,"  viii,  2. 


60  ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  SPENSER 

There  are  two  modern  works  which  conceivably  may  have  had 
some  influence  on  the  fragment  called  "Mutability."  Professor 
Oliver  Elton,  in  Modern  Studies,^  says,  "With  all  [their]  difference  of 
spirit,  we  seem  to  find  an  echo  of  Bruno  in  Spenser's  ["Mutability"]." 
He  has  in  mind  mainly  the  Spaccio  de  la  Bestia  trionfante,  which,  he 
finds,  was  written  and  published  during  Bruno's  stay  in  England, 
1584-85. 

The  Spaccio  is  an  allegorical  proposal  for  the  overthrow  of  the 
current  social  ethics  and  the  establishment  of  a  fresh  code  of  human 
excellence.  There  is  first  a  vague  catastrophe.  Then  the  reigning 
vices  and  follies,  which  are  represented  by  the  constellations,  are 
displaced  by  virtues.  This  new  heaven  represents  a  new  society 
on  earth. 

The  scene  is  Olympus.  The  highly  immoral  Jove,  feeling  age  and 
impotency  coming  on,  and  dreading  death,  and  change  into  something 
which  shall  have  no  memory  of  Jove,  decides  on  a  reformation, 
especially  of  other  people.  On  the  anniversary  of  the  fall  of  the 
giants  he  calls  the  gods  together  and  requires  them  to  show  repentance 
by  completely  changing  the  chart  of  the  heavens.  This  change  is 
the  dispatch  of  the  triumphant  beast,  which  consists  of  all  the  old 
constellations,  that  is,  of  all  vices  and  follies.  Jove  perseveres  until 
the  whole  heavens  have  been  changed,  each  vice  being  displaced 
by  its  opposite  virtue. 

Professor  Elton  finds  that  both  Spenser  and  Bruno  play  with 
large  conceptions  of  change  and  recurrence,  and  both  present  a 
conclave  of  the  gods  led  by  Jove  and  discomfited  by  the  feeling  of 
decay.  The  machinery  of  the  two  pieces  is  alike  thus  far.  But  the 
idea  of  cyclic  change  which  essentially  is  not  change  is  absent  from 
Bruno's  allegory.  Professor  Elton  admits  that  the  idea  is  an  old 
one,  but  finds  that  it  had  been  rephrased  in  Bruno's  Eroici  Furori. 
Bruno's  rephrasing  of  this  idea,  which  Professor  Elton  quotes,  is  as 
follows : 

Death  and  dissolution  do  not  befit  this  entire  mass,  of  which  the  star 
that  is  our  globe  consists.  Nature  as  a  whole  cannot  suffer  annihilation; 
and  thus,  at  due  times,  in  fixed  order,  she  comes  to  renew  herself,  changing 
and  altering  all  her  parts;  and  this  it  is  fitting  should  come  with  fixity  of 
succession,  every  part  taking  the  place  of  all  the  other  parts Thus 

London,  1907,  chap.  i. 


"MUTABILITY"  61 

all  things  in  their  kind  have  the  vicissitudes  of  lordship  and  slavery,  felicity 
and  infelicity,  of  the  state  that  is  called  life,  and  the  state  that  is  called 
death;  of  light  and  darkness,  and  of  good  and  evil.  And  there  is  nothing 
which  by  natural  fitness  is  eternal  but  the  substance  which  is  matter.* 

Concerning  the  first  point  of  similarity  to  which  Professor  Elton 
calls  attention,  namely,  that  both  writers  play  with  large  concep- 
tions of  change  and  recurrence,  this  may  be  said:  If  this  fact  proves 
that  Bruno  influenced  Spenser,  then  Bruno's  influence  on  Spenser 
was  far-reaching.  For  not  only  does  Spenser  discuss  change  in 
everything  he  wrote;  but  he  several  times  deals  with  large  concep- 
tions of  change  and  recurrence.  In  the  Faerie  Queene,  III,  vi,  36  ff., 
for  example,  Spenser  tells  how  all  things  take  their  substances  from 
Chaos;  catch  a  form;  pass  into  life;  live,  die,  decay,  and  return 
to  Chaos;  only  to  pass  into  other  forms: 

For  in  the  wide  wombe  of  the  world  there  lyes, 
In  hatefuU  darknesse  and  in  deepe  horrore, 
An  huge  eternal  Chaos,  which  supplyes 
The  substances  of  natures  fruitfull  progenyes. 

All  things  from  thence  doe  their  first  being  fetch. 
And  borrow  matter,  whereof  they  are  made, 
Which  when  as  forme  and  feature  it  does  ketch, 
Becomes  a  bodie,  and  doth  then  invade 
The  state  of  life,  out  of  the  griesly  shade. 
That  substance  is  eterne,  and  bideth  so, 
Ne  when  the  life  decayes,  and  forme  does  fade. 
Doth  it  consume,  and  into  nothing  go. 
But  changed  is,  and  often  altred  to  and  fro. 

The  substance  is  not  chaunged,  nor  altered, 

But  th'  only  forme  and  outward  fashion ; 

For  every  substance  is  conditioned 

To  change  her  hew,  and  sundry  formes  to  don. 

Meet  for  her  temper  and  complexion: 

For  formes  are  variable  and  decay. 

There  follows  a  discussion  of  the  enemy,  "wicked  Time."  See  in 
the  same  canto,  46-47,  the  account  of  the  lover,  who 

All  be  he  subject  to  mortalitie, 

Yet  is  eterne  in  mutabilitie. 

And  by  succession  made  perpetuall. 

•  Modern  Studies,  p.  33. 


62  ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  SPENSER 

Again,  in  the  long  prologue  to  the  Book  on  Justice,  see  Spenser's 
account,  not  only  of  the  change  from  the  age  when  all  were  just  to 
the  present  age  of  injustice,  but  also  of  vast  changes  in  the  heavens, 
which  changes  are  related  to  the  moral  change.     Even  the  sun, 

Foure  times  his  place  he  shifted  hath  in  sight, 
And  twice  hath  risen,  where  he  now  doth  West, 
And  wested  twice,  where  he  ought  rise  aright. 

Once  more,  in  the  second  canto  of  the  Book  on  Justice,  29  ff.,  we 
have  an  argument  and  reply  strikingly  like  those  in  the  fragment 
called  "Mutabihty."  The  Gyant  with  the  "huge  great  paire  of 
ballance"  justifies  a  political  revolution  on  the  ground  that  earth, 
fire,  air,  and  water  have  all  encroached  on  each  other.  The  decision, 
given  by  the  Knight  of  Justice,  is  that  the  change  is  only  apparent; 
in  reality  they  have  not  encroached  on  each  other. 

Another  thing  may  safely  be  said :  It  is  not  necessary  to  suppose 
that  Spenser  got  his  machinery  from  Bruno.  Not  only  was  Spenser 
writing  on  change  long  before  there  was  any  possibility  of  influence 
from  Bruno;  but  the  theme  was  a  favorite  one  in  the  Middle  Ages 
and  especially  in  the  Renaissance.^  See,  for  example,  at  the  end  of 
the  "Two  other  very  Commendable  Letters,"  now  printed  with  the 
Faerie  Queene,  "Certaine  Latin  Verses,  of  the  frailtie  and  Muta- 
bility of  all  things,,  saving  only  Vertue."  These  ''Verses"  were 
printed  in  1580,  four  years  before  Bruno's  allegory  was  written  and 
five  years  before  it  was  published.  Concerning  the  fact  that  both 
Spenser  and  Bruno  describe  "a  conclave  of  the  gods  led  by  Jove," 
an  important  part  of  the  second  of  Professor  Elton's  two  points  of 
similarity,  it  may  be  answered  that  Spencer  describes  such  a  con- 
clave in  his  Muiopotmos.  Moreover,  we  have  here  not  only  a  con- 
clave, but  a  trial,  as  is  the  case  in  the  fragment  called  "Mutability." 
There  is  a  debate  between  Minerva  and  Neptune  as  to  who  shall  be 
god  of  Athens.  Jove  tries  the  case  in  the  presence  of  the  assembled 
gods.  It  should  be  added  here  that  a  conclave  of  the  gods  is  a  com- 
monplace in  literature.  It  has  been  a  popular  theme  since  the  days 
of  Homer  and  Virgil.      See  Aeneid  x  and  Demeter,  yss.  313  ff.     See 

»  See,  for  example,  the  Romance  of  the  Rose,  Ellis'  tr.,  pp.  170-71  and  208-64,  or 
Chaucer's  Troilus  and  Criseyde  or  Monks  Tale.  See  also  Mod.  Lang.  Notes,  VIII  (1893)^ 
230  ff.  and  235  ff.,  and  Pub.  Mod.  Lang.  Assoc,  VIII  (1893).  303  ff.,  and  Neilson's  Court 
of  Love  and  Chambers'  Medieval  Stage. 


"MUTABILITY"  63 

also  Triggs's  edition  of  Lydgate's  Assembly  of  Gods,  1905,  E.E.T.S., 
Introduction,  pp.  lii  ff.,  and  O.  H.  Moore's  article  in  Mod.  Phil., 
XVI  (1918),  170.  It  ought  to  be  said  further  that  in  Bruno's 
allegory  there  is  no  trial,  and  Change  is  not  personified.  And, 
finally,  so  far  as  cyclic  change  is  concerned,  it  is  found,  as  we  have 
already  seen,  in  Aristotle. 

There  is  another  piece  of  modern  writing  which  may  possibly 
have  influenced  the  machinery  of  Spenser's  fragment:  The  Rare 
Triumphs  of  Love  and  Fortune.  This  play  is  in  places  strikingly 
like  Spenser's  fragment  called  "Mutability."  There  is  a  quarrel 
between  Venus  and  Fortune  as  to  how  much  power  each  has,  the 
quarrel  being  started  by  Fortune.  The  two  goddesses  appear  before 
Jupiter  and  the  assembled  gods  to  argue  the  case.  After  some  argu- 
ment Jupiter  decides  to  allow  Fortune  and  Venus  to  try  their  powers 
on  a  pair  of  faithful  lovers,  Fortune  to  do  her  worst  and  Venus  her 
best,  and  the  one  who  shows  the  greatest  might  to  be  allowed  the 
sovereignty.  First  one  and  then  the  other  seems  superior,  until 
finally  Jupiter  decides  that  in  this  and  all  other  cases  they  must 
compromise  and  not  thwart  each  other.  They  unite  to  make  the 
lovers  happy.  An  interesting  argument  made  by  Fortune  is  her 
assertion  that  all  things — the  sea,  the  air,  even  the  heavens,  the 
stars — feel  her  scars. ^ 

It  will  be  observed  that  this  play  is  like  Spenser's  fragment  in 
several  particulars.  In  the  play,  as  in  Spenser's  poem,  Fortune  is 
personified;  it  is  Fortune  who  starts  the  contest;  there  is  a  trial; 
and  the  trial  is  presided  over  by  Jupiter,  or  Jove,  in  the  presence  of 
the  assembled  gods.  The  decision  is  much  like  that  in  the  fragment ; 
just  as  in  the  fragment  Change  must  operate  in  accordance  with 
Nature,  so  in  the  Rare  Triumph  of  Love  and  Fortune  the  two  con- 
testants must  henceforth  work  in  harmony.  And,  finally,  both  in 
the  play  and  in  Spenser's  fragment.  Fortune,  or  Change,  bases  her 
claim  to  sovereignty  on  the  argument  that  the  sea,  the  air,  even  the 
heavens,  the  stars,  feel  her  might. 

I  know  of  nothing  which  makes  it  improbable  that  Spenser 
should  have  read  The  Rare  Triumphs  of  Love  and  Fortune.  There 
are  facts  which  make  it  doubtful  whether  he  ever  saw  Bruno's 

I  For  this  play  see  Dodsley's  Old  English  Plays,  Hazlitt,  Vol.  VI. 


64  ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  SPENSER 

Spaccio  and  Furori.  As  Professor  Elton  admits,  Bruno's  works 
made  little  if  any  impression  on  England  until  long  after  Bruno  and 
Spenser  were  dead;  they  were  not  studied  even  by  small  and  select 
circles.  From  all  that  is  known  of  Sidney's  life  and  thought  and 
character — and  much  is  known — we  may  be  sure  that  Sidney  could 
have  had  no  sympathy  with  the  teachings  of  the  Spaccio.  Spenser 
was  in  Ireland  during  Bruno's  stay  in  England.  It  is  not  impossible 
that  Sidney,  to  whom  the  Spaccio  was  dedicated,  may  have  sent 
Bruno's  allegory  to  Spenser,  as  Professor  Elton  suggests,  though  if 
he  had  read  it  before  sending  it  he  would  have  found  its  teachings 
repulsive  to  himself  and  would  have  known  they  would  be  so  to 
Spenser. 

But  whether  Spenser  read  Bruno  or  The  Rare  Triumphs  of  Love 
and  Fortune,  or  both,  this  much  is  certain:  he  did  not  draw  his 
ethical  teaching  or  his  theology  from  them.  The  Rare  Triumphs  of 
Love  and  Fortune  is  not  an  ethical  or  theological  discussion.  The 
Spaccio  is  a  study  of  ethical  and  theological  matters;  but  its  teach- 
ings are  diametrically  opposed  to  Spenser's  views.  The  whole 
spirit  of  the  Spaccio  is  opposed  to  Spenser's  thought  and  nature,  as 
Professor  Elton  recognized.  Spenser  is  chivalric;  Bruno  is,  in  the 
Spaccio,  realistic,  to  the  extent  of  the  frankest  recognition  of  human 
needs.  Spenser  is  reverent;  Bruno  is  irreverent,  impious.  Spenser 
everywhere  makes  loving  use  of  the  Old  and  New  Testaments,  and 
he  thinks  of  the  Deity  and  of  the  pagan  gods  as  having  human 
form  and  attributes;  Bruno  is  violently  against  Jewish  and  anthropo- 
morphic theology.  Professor  Elton  fully  recognizes  that  Bruno's 
teachings  could  not  appeal  to  Spenser.  For  example,  he  says,  "His 
[Bruno's]  ethics  did  not  appeal  to  Spenser,"  the  singer  of  Chivalry; 
and  again,  "The  ethical  ideal  that  results  [from  the  study  in  the 
Spaccio]  is  ....  a  corrective  to  that  set  forth  in  the  Faerie  QueeneJ' 

It  appears,  then,  that  although  the  discussion  of  "Mutability" 
in  the  fragment  forms  in  no  proper  sense  a  part  of  Spenser's  treat- 
ment of  the  "twelve  moral  virtues  of  Aristotle,"  it  is  composed  of 
ideas  derived  from  Aristotle — ideas  discussed  by  him  in  close  con- 
nection with  the  virtues,  moral  and  political. 


A  VEUE  OF  THE  PRESENT  STATE  OF  IRELAND 

Spenser's  A  Veue  of  the  Present  State  of  Ireland  is  a  practical  state 
paper.  It  has  the  definite  object  of  justifying  Lord  Grey  and  his 
policy  and  deploring  the  reversal  of  that  policy.  It  is  not  a  proposal 
for  the  establishment  of  an  ideal  government,  but  for  dealing  with 
conditions  which  are  already  fixed — such  as  the  state  of  civilization 
of  the  Irish,  the  great  difference  between  the  Irish  and  the  Enghsh 
peoples,  and  the  government  of  the  former  people  by  the  latter.  It 
is  not  a  theoretical  discussion  of  morality  and  politics. 

Nevertheless  there  are  everywhere  throughout  the  Veue  reflec- 
tions from  Aristotle.  Indeed  the  practical  nature  of  the  Veue 
is  itself  justified  by  arguments  which  are  to  be  found  in  some  of 
Aristotle's  more  practical  chapters.  In  the  Veue,  Spenser's  char- 
acters, Eudoxus  and  Irenius,  speak  as  follows,  Irenius  representing 
Spenser's  own  opinion : 

Eudox.:  Her  Majestie  may  yet,  when  it  shall  please  her,  alter  anything 
of  thos  former  ordinances,  or  appoynt  other  lawes,  that  may  be  more 
both  for  her  own  behoofe,  and  for  the  good  of  that  people. 

Iren.:  Not  so:  for  it  is  not  so  easy,  now  that  things  are  growne  into  an 
habit  and  have  ther  certain  course,  to  change  the  channell,  and  turn 
ther  streames  an  other  way;  for  they  may  have  now  a  collourable 
pretence  to  withstand  such  innovasion,  having  accepted  other  lawes  and 
rules  alredy. 

Eudox.:  As  for  the  lawes  of  England,  they  are  surely  most  just  and  most 
agreeable  both  with  the  government  and  with  the  nature  of  the  people : 
how  fklls  it  out  then,  that  you  seme  to  dislike  of  them,  as  not  so  meete 
for  that  realm  of  Ireland,  and  not  onely  the  common  law,  lent  also  the 
statutes  and  acts  of  parlament,  which  were  specially  provided  and 
intended  for  the  onely  benefit  thereof. 

Iren.:  I  was  shewing  you  by  what  means,  and  in  what  sort,  the  positive 
lawes  were  first  brought  in  and  established  by  the  Norman  Conqueror; 
which  were  not  by  him  devised,  nor  applyed  to  the  state  of  the  realme 
then  being,  nor  as  it  might  best  be,  (as  should  by  lawgivers  be  principally 
regarded,)  but  were  indede  the  very  lawes  of  his  owne  country  of 
Normandy:  the  condicon  whereof,  how  far  it  dilfereth  from  this  of 
England,  is  apparent  to  every  least  judgment.  But  to  transfer  the 
same  lawes  for  the  governing  of  the  realm  of  Ireland,  was  much  more 

65 


66  ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  SPENSER 

inconvenient  and  unmete:  In  Ireland  ....  they  were  otherwise 
effected,  and  yet  not  so  remayned,  so  as  the  same  lawes,  me  seemes, 
can  ill  fit  with  their  disposicion,  or  work  that  reformacon  that  is  wished : 
for  lawes  ought  to  be  fashioned  unto  the  manners  and  condicons  of  the 
people,  to  whom  they  are  ment,  and  not  to  be  imposed  upon  them 
according  to  the  simple  rule  of  right  ....  ffor  he  that  would  transfer 
the  lawes  of  the  Lacedemonians  to  the  people  of  Athens  should  find  a 
great  absurdity  and  inconvenience,  .  .  .  .^ 


Iren.:  I  doe  not  thinke  yt  convenient,  though  ....  to  change  all  the 
lawes  and  make  newe;  for  that  should  bread  great  trouble  and  confu- 
sione,  aswell  in  the  Englishe  now  dwellinge  and  to  be  planted,  as  alsoe 
in  the  Irishe.  For  the  Englishe,  having  bene  trained  upp  alwayes  in 
the  English  government,  will  hardely  be  enduced  unto  any  other,  and 
the  Irishe  wilbe  better  drawne  to  the  Englishe,  then  the  Englishe  to 
the  Irishe  governmente.  Therefore  since  wee  cannot  nowe  applie 
lawes  fitt  to  the  people,  as  in  the  first  institutione  of  commone-welthes 
it  ought  to  be,  wee  will  applye  the  people,  and  fitt  them  to  the  lawes, 
as  it  most  conveniently  maye  be.  The  lawes  therefore  we  resolve  shall 
abyde  in  the  sam  sorte  that  they  doe,  both  Commone  Lawes  and 
Statutes,  onely  suche  defects  in  the  Comone  Lawe,  and  inconveniens 
in  the  Statutes,  as  in  the  beginninge  wee  noted,  and  as  men  of  deep 
insights  shall  advise,  may  be  changed  by  other  newe  actes  and  ordy- 
nances  to  be  by  a  Parly amente  there  confirmed.^ 

Compare  this  with  the  following  passages  from  Aristotle's  Politics: 

Alterations  [of  the  laws]  seem  to  require  no  little  caution.  Where  the 
improvement  is  but  slight  compared  with  the  evil  of  accustoming  the  citizens 
lightly  to  repeal  the  lawes,  it  is  undoubtedly  our  duty  to  pass  over  some 
mistakes  whether  of  the  legislature  or  the  executive,  as  the  benefit  we  shall 
derive  from  the  alteration  will  not  be  equal  to  the  harm  we  shall  get  by 

accustoming  ourselves  to  disobey  authority For  all  the  potency  of 

the  law  to  secure  obedience  depends  upon  habit,  and  habit  can  only  be 
formed  by  lapse  of  time;  so  that  the  ready  transition  from  the  existing  laws 
to  others  that  are  new  is  a  weakening  of  the  efficacy  of  law  itself.' 


The  good  legislator  and  the  true  statesman  should  keep  his  eyes  open  not 
only  to  the  absolutely  best  polity  but  also  to  the  polity  which  is  best  under 
the  actual  conditions He  should  understand  the  poHty  which  is 


>  Grosart's  edition,  lines  390-444. 
» Ibid.,  lines  6176-98. 
•  Politics,  II,  viii. 


"A  VEUE  OF  THE  PRESENT  STATE  OF  IRELAND"        67 

most  appropriate  to  the  mass  of  states,  especially  as  the  great  majority  of 
political  writers,  even  if  successful  in  their  treatment  of  the  other  points, 
utterly  miss  the  mark  of  practical  utility.  For  it  is  not  only  the  absolutely 
best  polity  which  is  the  proper  subject  of  consideration,  but  also  that  which 

is  possible  in  any  given  case But  our  modern  writers  either  aspire 

to  the  highest  polity,  for  which  a  number  of  external  advantages  are  indis- 
pensable, or,  if  they  describe  a  form  more  generally  attainable,  put  out  of 
sight  all  existing  forms  except  the  favored  one  and  pronounce  a  panegyric 
upon  the  Lacedaemonian  or  some  other  polity.  What  we  want  however 
is  to  introduce  some  new  system  which  the  world  will  easily  be  induced  and 

enabled  to  accept  as  an  innovation  upon  the  existing  forms 

The  true  statesman  should  be  capable  of  coming  to  the  rescue  of  existing 

polities He  should  discern  the  best  laws  and  the  laws  appropriate 

to  each  form  of  polity,  as  it  is  the  laws  enacted  which  should  be,  and  in  fact 
are  universally  relative  to  the  pohties  rather  than  the  polities  to  the  laws.* 

The  passages  quoted  from  Spenser  will  show  the  practical  nature 
and  something  of  the  scope  of  the  Veue.  A  comparison  of  the 
excerpts  from  the  Veue  with  those  from  the  Politics  will  show  that 
Aristotle's  and  Spenser's  ideas  are  practically  identical.  It  will  be 
noted  that  both  writers  are  opposed  to  changing  the  laws  save  for 
weighty  reasons;  that  both  stress  the  importance  of  habit  in  con- 
nection with  obedience  to  the  law;  that  both  make  a  distinction 
between  the  ideally  perfect  polity  and  the  best  government  that 
may  be  had  under  given  conditions,  and  hold  that  the  lawmaker 
should  give  consideration  to  the  latter;  that  both  recognize  that  it 
is  necessary  to  consider  what  kind  of  government  or  laws  a  people 
can  be  induced  to  accept;  and  that  both  insist  that  the  laws  ought 
to  be  adapted  to  the  particular  polity  or  government  for  which  they 
are  intended.  Besides  the  agreement  in  principle,  there  are  certain 
agreements  in  detail  which  indicate  that  Spenser  had  the  Politics  in 
mind.  In  the  discussion  from  which  the  excerpts  are  taken,  Spenser, 
like  Aristotle,  names  Solon,  Lycurgus,  and  the  Lacedaemonians. 
Again  Spenser  refers  to  the  warhke  nature  of  the  Lacedaemonians, 
as  Aristotle  does  in  an  earlier  passage.  Yet  again,  in  insisting  that 
the  laws  should  be  adapted  to  the  polity  for  which  they  are  meant, 
Aristotle  complains  that 

our  modern  writers  either  aspire  to  the  highest  polity,  for  which  a  num- 
ber of  external  advantages  are  indispensable,  or,  if  they  describe  a  form  more 

»  Politics,  VI,  1. 


68  ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  SPENSER 

generally  attainable,  put  out  of  sight  all  existing  forms  except  the  favored 
one  and  pronounce  a  panegyric  upon  the  Lacedaemonian  or  some  other 
pohty; 

and  Spenser,  in  making  the  same  point,  says, 

Lawes  ought  to  be  fashioned  unto  the  manners  and  condiconsof  the  people, 
to  whom  they  are  ment,  and  not  to  be  imposed  upon  them  according  to  the 
simple  rule  of  right  ....  ffor  he  that  would  transfer  the  lawes  of  the 
Lacedaemonians  to  the  people  of  Athens  should  find  a  great  absurdity  and 
inconvenience. 

Such  points  of  resemblance  to  Aristotle  as  we  have  here  pointed 
out  are  to  be  found  throughout  the  Veue,  in  connection  with  the 
discussion  of  education,^  the  supremacy  of  the  law,^  and  many  other 
topics. 

>  Compare  the  Veue,  ed.  A.  B.  Grosart,  pp.  27,  28.  238.  239,  with  the  Politics,  V,  i; 
IV,  xiv,  XV ;  II,  v;   and  VIII,  ix. 

*  Compare  the  Veue,  p.  59,  with  the  PolHics,  III,  xv,  xvi;  II,  ix;  and  III,  xi. 


THE  SHEPHEARDES  CALENDER  AND  THE  MINOR 

POEMS 

Much  of  the  serious  matter  in  The  Shepheardes  Calender  and 
the  minor  poems  is  ecclesiastical.  Nevertheless,  the  influence  of 
Aristotle  is  unmistakable. 

In  the  Calender  the  July  eclogue  is  plainly  Aristotelian.  It 
teaches  the  doctrine  of  the  mean.  For  this  opinion  we  do  not  have 
to  depend  upon  Thomahn's  emblem:  "In  medio  virtus";  or  upon 
E.  K.'s  statement,  in  the  gloss,  that,  "He  taketh  occasion  to  prayse 
the  meane  and  lowly  state  ....  according  to  the  saying  of  olde 
Philosophers,  that  vertue  dwelleth  in  the  middest,  being  environed 
with  two  contrary  vices."  The  teaching  of  the  eclogue  itself  is 
too  clear  to  be  misunderstood.  But  not  only  does  the  eclogue  teach 
the  Aristotelian  doctrine  of  the  mean;  it  teaches  the  mean  concern- 
ing ambition,  which  mean  is  one  of  the  Aristotelian  virtues. 

Again,  in  the  October  eclogue  there  is  Aristotelian  influence. 
Spenser  refers  to  the  influence  of  music  on  the  soul,  and  E.  K.  cites 
Aristotle  and  Plato  as  authorities  on  the  subject.  For  Aristotle's 
long  discussion  of  the  influence  of  music  on  the  soul  and  character 
see  the  Politics,  V,  v. 

Spenser's  Fowre  Hymnes  are  Platonic,  as  all  ambitious  love 
poetry  of  the  period  was  expected  to  be;  but  throughout  the  rest 
of  the  minor  poems  there  is  a  more  or  less  important  Aristotelian 
influence.  For  example,  in  Mother  Huhberds  Tale,  lines  143  to  145, 
Aristotle's  two  standards  of  right,  political  and  natural  justice,  are 
named: 

There  is  no  right  in  this  partition, 

Ne  was  it  so  by  institution, 

Ordained  first,  ne  by  the  law  of  Nature. 

Again,  in  Muiopotmos,  line  178,  "All  change  is  sweet,"  reflects 
Aristotle's  "But  change,  as  the  poet  says,  is  'the  sweetest  thing 
in  the  world. '"^  Yet  again,  in  Mother  Hubberds  Tale,  lines  126  and 
1131,  we  have  as  a  standard  the  Aristotelian  "rule  of  reason."  4^ 

1  Nicomachean  Ethics,  VII,  XV. 

69 


<'''.''i'6''  ■■'■  '        •  ARISTOTLE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  SPENSER 

This  brings  to  a  close  my  study  of  the  influence  of  Aristotle's 
Politics  and  Ethics  on  Spenser.  To  the  argument  that  any  given 
point  of  similarity  between  Aristotle  and  Spenser  may  be  purely  a 
coincidence  there  is  no  answer.  But  these  points  of  similarity  are 
too  numerous  to  be  the  result  of  chance.  Aristotle  certainly  had  a 
very  considerable  influence  on  Spenser. 


KOV  2»  »"'' 


f- 


14  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 

LOAN  DEPT. 

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